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other industries, this study provides insight to the impact of this type of salary structure 
firm tenure, career length, and the experience distribution.  
 
In the first essay, I analyze the impact of minimum salaries on firm tenure and 
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NFL data is that I am able to control for a player’s productivity.  I find statistically 
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minimum prices change, the experience distribution changes. 
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1 Introduction to Dissertation 
Over the years, researchers and policymakers have estimated the impact of 
minimum wages.   Minimum wages have typically impact low skilled workers.  Previous 
research has focused on the impact of minimum wages on employment (Brown et al., 
1982; Card, 1992a; Card and Krueger, 1994) and on the earnings distribution (Behrman 
et al., 2001; Dickens et al., 1999; Johnson and Browning, 2001; Katz and Krueger, 1992; 
Neumark et al., 2004).   A compensation structure similar to minimum wages is 
minimum salaries.  Both minimum wages and minimum salaries restrict a firm’s options 
to compensating workers to levels at or above the set minimum.  The key difference is 
that minimum wages place a lower limit on the amount of compensation a worker can 
receive for an hour of work while minimum salaries place a lower limit on the amount of 
compensation a worker can receive for a year of work.  This is an important distinction 
because firms that encounter minimum wages have the ability to employ a worker for an 
entire year and reduce the total yearly income paid to the worker by reducing the 
worker’s hours.  Firms that encounter minimum salaries do not have the ability to employ 
the worker for an entire year and reduce the total yearly income below the mandated 
minimum salary.  This dissertation analyzes the impact of minimum salaries on firm 
tenure, career length, and the experience distribution using data from the National 
Football League (NFL). 
I find evidence that minimum salaries shorten an NFL player’s firm tenure and 
career length.  The advantage of using NFL data to study the impact of minimum salaries 
on firm tenure and career length is that it allows me to control for player and team 
productivity.   Limitations of using NFL data include the fact that the industrial structure 
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differs from most industries, the minimum salaries are higher than most industries, and 
the data only includes males.  Despite the differences between the NFL and other 
industries that employ minimum salaries, this evidence has implications for the NFL as 
well as other industries.  This evidence provide implications for other industries because 
any time the salary structure force a firm to pay a worker more than the value of the 
worker to the firm,  the worker’s tenure in that particular firm is expected to be shortened.       
The NFL’s salary structure includes a minimum salary schedule which can be 
used to measure the impact of minimum salaries on firm tenure, career length, and the 
experience distribution.  The NFL’s salary structure consists of a minimum salary 
schedule, a total salary cap, and a total salary floor.  A minimum salary schedule is a 
compensation structure in which the minimum amount that can be paid to an employee 
on an annual basis is mandated at all levels of experience and increases with an 
employee’s experience.  The NFL’s minimum salary schedule provides the mandated 
minimum salary a player can receive based on the year and the player’s number of 
credited seasons.  A player earns a credited season when he is on a team’s fifty-three 
player active roster or injured reserve for at least three of the sixteen games played.  
Table 1.1 shows the minimum salary schedule by credited seasons from 2000 to 2009.  
Table 1.2 adjusts for inflation and shows the minimum salary schedule by credited 
seasons from 2000 to 2009 in 2009 dollars.  The salary cap places an upper limit on the 
total amount a team can spend on all of its players.  The salary cap is considered to be a 
hard cap because teams are penalized for exceeding the salary cap value.  An exception to 
the salary cap is that veteran players who do not receive any bonuses are allowed to be 
paid the veteran minimum up to $810,000 and only count $425,000 against the team’s 
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salary cap value.  For example, if a player is paid the veteran minimum of $720,000 in 
2007, only $425,000 of $720,000 counts against the team’s salary cap.  The salary floor 
places a lower limit on the total amount a team can spend on all of its players.  The salary 
floor is considered to be a hard floor because teams are penalized for spending less than 
the salary floor value.   
Minimum salary schedules are usually negotiated to protect older, more 
experienced workers from receiving extremely low salaries.  Minimum salary schedules 
exist predominantly in unionized and government workplaces.  These schedules are 
present in public education, professional sports, the Episcopalian church, the Secret 
Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and other federal government agencies.  In union 
jobs minimum salary schedules are typically negotiated between a labor organization 
representing a group of employees and a representative for the employers.  In federal 
government jobs minimum salaries are determined by the General Schedule (GS) pay 
scale.  In the NFL, the minimum salary schedule is negotiated between the NFL’s Players 
Association and the NFL’s Management Council and is available in the NFL’s Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).  Minimum salary schedules are viewed as being beneficial 
to employees because their existence places a lower limit on the salary employees are 
allowed to receive.  This can increase the value of the career earnings of workers who 
would have earned less than the minimum salary in the absence of the minimum salary 
schedule if they are employed long enough for the value of their earnings with the 
minimum salary schedule in place to exceed the value of their career earnings without the 
minimum salary schedule in place.  
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I define firm tenure as the amount of time an employee spends employed by a 
particular firm without any interruptions.  If an employee works for firm A for 1 year, 
leaves firm A to work for firm B for 2 years, then returns to firm A for 2 years, this 
employee is attributed with 3 separate firm tenures.  When an employee returns to firm A 
after worker for another firm, the time with firm A is treated as 2 separate firm tenures.  I 
define career length as the amount of time an employee spends in a particular industry.  
In the presence of a minimum salary schedule it is possible for the mandated salary in 
year t+1 to exceed the value of the employee’s productivity to the firm in year t+1.  
When the marginal cost of the employee to the firm is greater than the value of the 
employee’s productivity, the firm will choose to dismiss the employee and hire a new 
employee when possible.  In this situation, the employee’s dismissal from the firm is 
induced by the increase in the minimum salary that is mandated by the minimum salary 
schedule.  Therefore, the presence of a minimum salary schedule could have a negative 
impact on an employee by shortening their career length to a point in which the value of 
career earnings in the presence of the minimum salary schedule is less than the value of 
career earnings in the absence of the minimum salary schedule.   
Firm tenure and career length are expected to be shortened when an employer is 
required by the minimum salary schedule to give an employee a raise.  A raise is 
considered to be mandatory when the employee’s salary has to be increased independent 
of other wage-determining factors.  The level of the mandated minimum compensation at 
each experience level in the minimum salary schedule impacts whether employees 
experience the negative impact of having the value of their career earnings decreased or 
the positive impact of having the value of their career earnings increased.  
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A minimum salary schedule also has the ability to change the relative minimum 
prices between different experience levels.  When the relative minimum price between 
two levels of experience change, firms have an incentive to substitute away from the 
experience level in which the relative minimum price becomes more expensive.  
Therefore, minimum salary schedules have the ability to change the experience 
distribution through changing the relative minimum prices. 
 In chapter two, I examine the impact of minimum salaries on a player’s firm 
tenure and career length for six positional groups, defensive backs, defensive linemen, 
linebackers, running backs, tight ends, and wide receivers.  I use two measures to 
examine the impact of minimum salaries on a player’s firm tenure and career length, 
mandatory raise and income increase.  I define a mandatory raise as the base salary 
increase a team must give to a player from year t to year t+1 in order for the player to 
earn the minimum salary for year t+1.  I define income increase as the total increase in 
income a player must receive from year t to year t+1 in order for the player to earn the 
minimum salary for year t+1.  The difference between these two measures is that a player 
requires a mandatory raise when his base salary is less than the next year’s minimum 
salary but a player requires an income increase when his base salary plus bonuses is less 
than the next year’s minimum salary.  I find statistically significant evidence that 
minimum salaries shorten firm tenure by almost a year for tight ends and by more than 
two-thirds of a year for wide receivers when they force teams to give players a mandatory 
raise.  I find statistically significant evidence that minimum salaries shorten firm tenure 
by more than two-thirds of a year for defensive linemen, by more than one-half of a year 
for linebackers, by more than one-third of a year for running backs, and by more than a 
 6   
year for tight ends when they force teams to give players an income increase.  I find 
statistically significant evidence that minimum salaries shorten career length by more 
than two years for defensive backs, by more than five years for defensive linemen, and by 
more than two years for running backs when they force teams to give players a 
mandatory raise.  I find statistically significant evidence that minimum salaries shorten 
career length by more than three years for defensive backs, by more than three years for 
defensive linemen, by more than two years for linebackers, and by more than two years 
for running backs when they force teams to give players an income increase.     
 In chapter three, I examine the impact of minimum salaries on the experience 
distribution.  I exploit the fact that the NFL’s minimum salary schedule causes the 
relative minimum price between two experience levels to change over time.  This 
provides teams with an incentive to substitute away from the experience level whose 
relative minimum price is becoming more expensive over time.  I create the relative 
minimum price of all other experience levels in terms of 0 years of experience by 
dividing the minimum price for a particular level of experience by the minimum price for 
0 years of experience.  I find evidence that the experience distribution changes when 
relative minimum prices change. 
  
Copyright © Johnny C. Ducking 2011 
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Table 1.1:  Minimum Salaries by Credited Seasons 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0  Seasons 193,000 209,000 225,000 225,000 230,000 230,000 275,000 285,000 295,000 310,000 
1  Season 275,000 298,000 300,000 300,000 305,000 305,000 350,000 360,000 370,000 385,000 
2  Seasons 358,000 389,000 375,000 375,000 380,000 380,000 425,000 435,000 445,000 460,000 
3  Seasons 385,000 418,000 450,000 450,000 455,000 455,000 500,000 510,000 520,000 535,000 
4  Seasons 413,000 448,000 525,000 530,000 535,000 540,000 585,000 595,000 605,000 620,000 
5 or 6 Seasons 440,000 477,000 525,000 530,000 535,000 540,000 585,000 595,000 605,000 620,000 
7, 8, or 9  Seasons 440,000 477,000 650,000 655,000 660,000 665,000 710,000 720,000 730,000 745,000 
10 or more Seasons 440,000 477,000 750,000 755,000 760,000 765,000 810,000 820,000 830,000 845,000 
 
 
 
Table 1.2:  Minimum Salaries by Credited Seasons in 2009 Dollars 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0  Seasons 240,451 253,180 268,320 262,341 261,215 252,655 292,647 294,890 293,951 310,000 
1  Season 342,611 360,994 357,760 349,789 346,394 335,042 372,460 372,492 368,684 385,000 
2  Seasons 446,018 471,230 447,201 437,236 431,573 417,430 452,273 450,095 443,417 460,000 
3  Seasons 479,656 506,361 536,641 524,683 516,751 499,817 532,086 527,698 518,150 535,000 
4  Seasons 514,540 542,702 626,081 617,960 607,609 593,190 622,540 615,647 602,848 620,000 
5 or 6  Seasons 548,178 577,833 626,081 617,960 607,609 593,190 622,540 615,647 602,848 620,000 
7, 8, or 9  Seasons 548,178 577,833 775,148 763,705 749,573 730,502 755,562 744,985 727,403 745,000 
10 or more Seasons 548,178 577,833 894,401 880,301 863,145 840,352 861,979 848,455 827,047 845,000 
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2 Do Minimum Salaries Shorten Firm Tenure or Career Length? 
In many jobs where minimum salary schedules are utilized, such as public 
education, federal government agencies, and unionized industries, it is difficult to fire an 
employee.  When mechanisms are in place making it difficult to fire an employee, it is 
possible that some employees receive salaries that are higher than their value to the firm.  
In this situation a firm may want to release an employee but it may be too difficult or 
costly.  Besides shortening careers, minimum salary schedules can force firms to over-
pay employees.  It may be difficult to measure the workers’ value to the firm when firms 
are able to dismiss employees.  The existence of minimum salary schedules may also 
have an impact on hiring practices leading to less hiring.  These things make it difficult to 
measure the impact of minimum salary schedules on firm tenure and career length, as 
hiring and retention are both endogenous.   
One advantage of using NFL data is that an employee’s performance statistics are 
easily measured, providing the ability to control for a player’s productivity.  Another 
advantage is that in the NFL, contracts are not guaranteed.  This gives the employer the 
ability to dismiss a player when his mandated minimum salary exceeds the value of his 
productivity.  Although the NFL differs in various ways from other industries with 
minimum salary schedules, the results from this study should provide insight about the 
impact of minimum salary schedules on firm tenure and career length if job protection 
were relaxed in public education and government agencies. 
The NFL has a roster constraint of 53 players in place during the regular season.  
Due to this roster limit, no NFL team will ever have more than 53 players on its active 
roster.  At any point during the regular season most teams will have the maximum 
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number of players allowed on their active rosters.  Since teams typically have no less than 
53 players and are not allowed to have more than 53 players at a given time, increasing 
the price of a player as his level of experience increases will not have a large impact on 
the number of players employed by the team.  Increasing the price of a player as his level 
of experience increases can provide NFL teams with the incentive to substitute less 
experienced, cheaper players for more experienced expensive players.  This incentive 
exists as long as the younger, inexperienced players are more profitable than the older, 
experienced players.  Therefore, the NFL’s minimum salary schedule can reduce firm 
tenure and career length through this incentive.   
The contribution of this paper is that it is one of the first to measure the impact of 
minimum salaries on firm tenure and career length.  I use data that allow us to see how 
minimum salary schedules impact firm tenure and career length when firms are able to 
dismiss employees.  This enables us to see what could happen if it were easier for firms 
with a minimum salary schedule to dismiss employees.  I find statistically significant 
evidence that firm tenure and career length are shortened when minimum salaries force 
an employer to increase an employee’s income.   
2.1 Theoretical Model 
A number of previous studies of professional sports leagues have made the 
assumption that teams maximize profits (Hamlen Jr., 2007; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Scully, 
1974; Vrooman, 1995).  I also assume that NFL teams maximize profits.  The revenue 
generated by player i is equal to the value of the marginal product from employing player 
i, VMPi.  VMPi is also the maximum amount a team is willing to pay player i.  In a 
perfectly competitive industry an employee’s salary is equal to the value of his marginal 
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product.  In the NFL, employers may have monopsony power because players chosen in 
the NFL draft can sign contracts only with the team that drafts them.   
Draft picks in the NFL are initially assigned in a manner that the teams with the 
lowest winning percentages have the earlier picks in each of the seven rounds.  The 
maximum length for a rookie contract is 6 years for players chosen in the first half of the 
first round of the NFL draft, 5 years for players chosen in the second half of the first 
round of the NFL draft, and 4 years for players chosen in the second through seventh 
rounds of the NFL draft.  Each round of the NFL draft typically has 32 selections, one 
selection for each team.  Any undrafted free agents with 3 years of experience or less can 
only negotiate with their initial team when their contracts expire if the initial team offers 
them a 1 year contract.   
Even though teams have some monopsony power, evidence reveals that player 
salaries are close to the value of their marginal products (MacDonald and Reynolds, 
1994; Rosen and Sanderson, 2000).  The salary paid to player i, Si, is an amount that is 
negotiated between the player and the team (Conlin and Emerson, 2003).  A player faces 
a different mandated minimum salary, MMSi, at each level of experience.  The player’s 
negotiated salary is less than or equal to the value of marginal product and greater than or 
equal to his mandated minimum salary, MMSi ≤ Si ≤ VMPi.  I define profits per player 
as the difference between the value of a player’s marginal product and the salary paid to 
him, VMPi – Si.  Teams employ the 53 players for which the sum of profits per player is 
the largest.  Therefore, each team’s total profits are a function of profits per player,   
(1)  profits = f(VMP1 – S1,VMP2 – S2, …,VMP53 – S53) 
     where  
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VMP1 – S1 > VMP54 – S54, VMP2 – S2 > VMP54 – S54, …, VMP53 – S53 > VMP54 – 
S54. 
Even though the value of a player’s marginal product may depend on the productivities of 
the other players employed by the team, team management has an idea of a player’s value 
of marginal product given various combinations of players.  Management ultimately 
chooses the combination of players in a manner that maximizes profits. 
The minimum salary schedule has the ability to shorten firm tenure or career 
length of players through two mechanisms.  The first mechanism operates when the 
minimum salary schedule causes the mandated minimum salary to exceed the player’s 
value of marginal product.  When the mandated minimum salary exceeds the value of 
player i’s marginal product, the team is going to dismiss player i.  In this case player i’s 
firm tenure is shortened.  Player i’s career length is shortened if no other team employs 
player i.  Therefore, if 
(2)  VMPi - MMSi < 0, 
player i’s firm tenure is shortened and career length also may be shortened.  This 
mechanism can occur when a team is forced to give a player a mandatory raise that 
makes player i’s salary greater than his value of marginal product.  This mechanism can 
also occur when player i’s value of marginal product decreases to a level lower than his 
mandated minimum salary.  I am able to identify directly the situations when a team is 
forced to give a player a raise but I am not able to identify when a team would like to 
give a player a pay cut that is not allowed.  If a team is not forced to give a player a 
mandatory raise or is allowed to give a player a pay cut it is assumed that the team is 
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acting optimally.  The NFL’s wage structure artificially increases the minimum cost of an 
input for teams whether there is a corresponding increase in the value of the player or not. 
The second mechanism operates when the minimum salary schedule causes the 
profits per player from hiring player i to fall below the profits per player from hiring 
player j.   Player j is the individual with the largest profits per player not previously 
employed by the team who is capable of replacing player i’s duties on the team.1  If this 
occurs, the team is going to dismiss player i and hire player j.  In this case player i’s firm 
tenure is shortened.  Player i’s career length is shortened if no other team employs player 
i.  Therefore, when 
(3)  VMPi – MMSi < VMPj – Sj, 
player i’s firm tenure is shortened and career length may be shortened.   This mechanism 
can occur when a team is forced to give a player a mandatory raise that makes the profits 
per player from employing player i less than the profits per player from employing player 
j.  This mechanism can also occur when the value of player i’s marginal product 
decreases to a level that makes the profits per player from employing player i less than 
the profits per player from employing player j.  If for all NFL teams, VMPj – Sj > 0 the 
mechanism displayed in equation (3) is the only mechanism that is relevant. 
 When firm tenure or career length of a player is shortened total employment 
remains the same but the experience distribution of those employed is changed when the 
team hires a younger, cheaper player.  This salary structure is mainly expected to impact 
                                                 
1 The position of player j may depend on the position of player i.  If the team is looking for a replacement player to 
perform player i’s duties, the position of player j would be one of the positions capable of replacing player i’s duties on 
the field.  Depending on player i’s role on the team, there may be one of many positions capable of replacing player i’s 
duties.  If the team does not need a player to perform player i’s specific duties, the team will simply employ the player 
with the highest profits per player who was not previously employed by the team. 
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an average or marginal player because the value of marginal product for a star player is 
significantly larger than his mandated minimum salary.  If a player’s salary is equal to or 
close to the mandated minimum salary, an additional year of experience could cause the 
player to lose his job due to the mechanisms in equation (2) or (3) listed above.  The 
minimum salary schedule is also expected to reduce efficiency by eliminating a set of 
outcomes that could be mutually beneficial for both teams and players.   
2.2 Literature 
To date, there has not been much research analyzing the impact of minimum 
salary schedules on firm tenure or career length.  Much of the research regarding 
minimum levels of compensation focus on whether raising the minimum wage reduces 
the level of employment.  Minimum wage discussions have been an important research 
topic for many years because of the tension between the potential benefits as a tool to 
increase income and the potential costs in terms of employment levels.  Minimum salary 
schedules are interesting because they too have a tension between the benefits to the 
employees from higher salaries and the costs both to the employer through higher 
earnings but also to the employee through shorter career.  There has been little literature 
examining whether minimum salary schedules affect career length.  This paper will make 
a contribution to the literature on minimum levels of compensation by looking at the 
impact of a minimum salary schedule on an employee’s firm tenure and career length.   
Brown et al. (1982) survey the minimum wage literature and indicate that time 
series studies typically find that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage reduces 
teenage employment by one to three percent.  They indicate that the impact of the 
minimum wage on young adult employment is smaller than it is for teenagers.  Johnson 
 
14 
and Browning (1983) focus on the efficiency–equity tradeoff and develop estimates of 
the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the level and distribution of income 
across households.  They find that a minimum wage increase redistributes income 
downward even though there is a small net effect.  They reveal that workers with the 
lowest initial wages experience greater disemployment.  Katz and Krueger (1992) use a 
longitudinal survey of fast-food chains in Texas and analyze the impact of increases in 
the federal minimum wage on a low-wage labor market.  They find that employment 
increased more in the firms that were most likely to have been impacted by the 1991 
minimum wage increase.  Card (1992a) looks at the April 1990 increase in the federal 
minimum wage and finds no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage significantly 
lowered teenage employment rates.   Card (1992b) examines the impact of a 1988 
twenty-seven percent increase in the California state minimum wage and finds no 
evidence of a decline in teenage employment.   Card and Krueger (1994) examined the 
impact of a minimum wage increase in New Jersey by comparing employment growth at 
stores in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.   They find no evidence that the rise in minimum 
wages reduced employment.  Dickens et al. (1999) provide a theoretical model where 
employers have some monopsony power.  Their model allows the minimum wage to have 
a positive, negative or neutral impact on employment.  They use data from the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) and find that minimum wages compress the earnings distribution 
but do not negatively impact employment.  Cardoso and Portugal (2005) use a dataset 
from Portugal on workers, firms, and collective bargaining contracts.  They find that the 
wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and firm attributes but shrinks the returns to 
union power.  Conlin and Emerson (2003) test for a multidimensional separating 
 
15 
equilibrium in contract negotiations and test for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in 
many contracts.  They find that players use prolonged contract negotiations and 
incentives to reveal their private information.  They also find that a player’s effort level is 
dependent on the structure of his contract.  Kahn (2000) emphasizes that the availability 
of sports data gives researchers a unique opportunity to test some parts of economic 
theory that are not feasible with other data sets.  He also advises researchers to be careful 
before making generalizations about the general population using sports data.  He focuses 
on four areas of economic theory that could be looked at in more detail using the sports 
industry:  the impact of monopsony power on worker pay, the presence of discrimination, 
the Coase theorem, and the impact of supervision and incentives on behavior.   
This literature provides evidence that when floors are placed on the level of 
compensation, the level of employment could increase, decrease, or remain the same.  In 
the NFL the level of employment is basically fixed and teams are not likely to make 
adjustments along this margin.  Given that teams are not likely to change the level of 
employment in the presence of these mandated minimum salaries, it is likely that the type 
of worker employed changes when a mandated minimum salary is binding.  This 
literature also discusses the role of contract negotiations in the NFL and the advantages of 
using sports data.  In my theoretical model the salary paid to the player is negotiated 
between representatives of the team and the player.  Therefore, contract negotiations play 
a large role in determining a team’s profits per player.  One advantage is that sports data 
allow economists to test theories that other datasets do not allow.  Another advantage of 
sports data is that it has good measures of worker productivity.   
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2.3 Empirical Model 
 In order to analyze the impact of the NFL’s salary structure on a player’s firm 
tenure and career length, I estimate hazard models using a sample of NFL players.  The 
hazard model estimates the impact of minimum salaries and other relevant explanatory 
variables on the length of time a player spends with a given team and the length of time a 
player spends in the NFL.  A hazard model defines an event which ends a spell of time, 
and such an event is called a failure, which is a statistical term with no implication that 
the event is desirable or undesirable.  The failure in this research is either the end of a 
player’s firm tenure or the end of a player’s NFL career.  The hazard model calculates the 
conditional probability that the failure occurs between time period t and t+1, given that 
the failure has not occurred before time period t.   
 I estimate Weibull proportional hazard models using a sample for firm tenure and 
a sample for career length.  The Weibull proportional hazard model assumes that the 
baseline hazard function has a Weibull distribution and allows covariates to have a 
proportional impact on the hazard.  The baseline hazard is denoted by h0(t), time is 
denoted by t, the set of covariates is denoted by x j, and the Weibull proportional hazard 
model is denoted by h(t|xj).  The parameter p describes the direct effect of time, net of 
other explanatory variables, in Weibull distributions.  If p>1, the hazard increases over 
time, while if p<1, the hazard decreases over time.  In sports, the hazard increases over 
time (p>1) because the hazard of ending a career is large and growing year by year, based 
on aging.  The hazard is exponentiated because it must be positive to be a conditional 
probability of an event occurring at time t given that the event did not occur before t.   
(4)  h0(t) = ptp – 1exp(β0) 
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(5)  h(t|xj) = h0(t)exp(xjβx) 
(6)  h(t|xj) = ptp – 1exp(β0 + xjβx) 
The Weibull distribution allows for flexibility in the baseline hazard and is an 
appropriate choice as long as the baseline hazard is monotonically increasing or 
decreasing.  The proportional hazard model allows both time-varying and time invariant 
covariates to have a proportional impact on the baseline hazard.  There are many other 
possible functional forms, but the estimates from hazard models are not sensitive to these 
alternatives as long as there are no policy spikes, times at which many failures occur, 
such as 52 weeks of unemployment or the date of reauthorization of welfare benefits.  
See Manton, Singer, and Woodbury.  There are no such fixed policy times in sports 
careers. 
Two important terms in hazard models, also known as duration or survival time 
models, are right censoring and left censoring.  Those terms are based on a left to right 
time scale as in a graph.  Right censoring refers to incomplete spells, here career duration 
or job duration which is, happily for the player, continuing.  That is handled by hazard 
models with the survivor function, which is the probability at time t that a spell has not 
ended by time t.  Left censoring refers to a spell, here a career or job, which is already in 
progress when the data set begins.  That can be modeled only by making an assumption 
about unseen data before the spell begins.  Such assumptions are problematic and avoided 
whenever possible.  Careers in professional football are short enough that the data set can 
be confined to spells beginning in 2000 or later without damaging the ability to estimate 
the model.  There is no left censoring.   
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2.4 Data 
I use NFL data on defensive backs, defensive linemen, linebackers, running backs, 
tight ends, and wide receivers from 2000 to 2008.  I chose these six positional groups for 
two reasons: performance statistics that can be used to measure their productivity are 
readily available and there are typically at least 3 players that play these positions during 
the course of a football game.  The first reason is important because the availability of 
performance statistics allow me to control for a player’s productivity.  The second reason 
is important because choosing positions where there is typically less than 3 players 
playing in a game will result in an extremely small sample size.  This is because a large 
percentage of careers for players in positions where less than 3 players play in a game 
started prior to the 2000 football season.  These left censored observations are excluded 
from the analysis leaving a small sample size.  I exclude quarterbacks, punters, and 
kickers because typically only one player plays these positions during the course of a 
football season.   I exclude offensive linemen because they do not have any performance 
measures to control for productivity.  Productivity, team, income, and demographic 
information are used to measure the impact of minimum salaries on firm tenure and 
career length for these six positional groups.  In the firm tenure analysis, I also use 
information on the number of teams that previously employed the player to control for 
the tenures a player spent with other teams.  I obtain data on player performance and 
demographic information from the NFL official website (www.nfl.com/players).  I use 
the minimum salary schedule to determine a player’s mandated minimum salary.  I obtain 
salary data on a player’s base salary, signing bonus, other bonuses from the USA Today’s 
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NFL salary database (content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/football/nfl/salaries/team).  I 
used the CPI with 2009 as the base year in order to adjust for inflation.  
2.4.1 Failure and Explanatory Variables 
The failure variable used to indicate whether a player’s firm tenure ends is a set of 
dummy variables representing each season a player played for a specific team.  It is 
coded 1 for the season a player exits that specific team and 0 for all seasons the player 
does not exit that team.  The failure variable used to indicate whether a player’s career 
length ends is a set of dummy variables representing each season a player played in the 
NFL.  It is coded 1 for the season a player exits the NFL and 0 for all seasons the player 
does not exit the NFL.  I determine which seasons a player plays in the NFL by the 
season variable that is included in both the NFL official website data and the USA Today 
NFL salary database.  I determine which season is the player’s last season in the NFL by 
identifying the last year indicated by the season variable in both the NFL official website 
data and the USA Today NFL salary database.    
Player performance measures are time varying, while player demographic 
variables are fixed throughout the players tenure and career.  The explanatory variables of 
interest in this analysis are mandatory raise and income increase.  Mandatory raise and 
income increase are used to identify the impact of the minimum salaries on firm tenure 
and career length.  Mandatory raise is defined as the base salary increase a team must 
give to a player from year t to year t+1 in order for the player to earn the minimum salary 
for year t+1.  Income increase is defined as the total increase in income a player must 
receive from year t to year t+1 in order for the player to earn the minimum salary for year 
t+1.  The difference between these two measures is that a player requires a mandatory 
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raise when his base salary is less than the next year’s minimum salary but a player 
requires an income increase when his base salary plus bonuses is less than the next year’s 
minimum salary.   
Mandatory raise is created by taking the difference between the mandated 
minimum salary in year t+1 and the base salary in year t.  When this difference is 
negative mandatory raise is set equal to zero because a player does not have to receive a 
salary increase to remain employed in the NFL.  When this difference is positive 
mandatory raise is equal to the difference because this difference represents the amount a 
player must receive in order to reach his next mandated minimum salary and remain 
employed in the NFL.  The base salary reflects the marginal cost of employing a player.  
The minimum salary schedule causes an increase in the marginal cost of a player when 
the next mandated minimum salary is greater than the base salary.  Mandatory raise is 
measured in units of $10,000.  I also create a dummy variable, mandatory raise indicator, 
which is coded one when a player has to receive a mandatory raise and zero when a 
player does not have to receive a mandatory raise.  Mandatory raise is expected to have a 
negative impact on firm tenure and career length because it increases the team’s marginal 
cost without increasing the team’s marginal revenue.   
Income increase is created by taking the difference between the mandated 
minimum salary in year t+1 and the total compensation, base salary plus bonuses, in year 
t.  When this difference is negative income increase is set equal to zero because a player 
does not have to receive an increase in income to remain employed in the NFL.  When 
this difference is positive income increase is equal to the difference because this 
difference represents the additional income a player must receive in order for his total 
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compensation to equal his next mandated minimum salary.  Although, the base salary 
reflects the marginal cost of employing a player, income increase captures the players 
who have to receive a mandatory raise whose total compensation in year t is less than 
their mandated minimum salary in year t+1.  Income increase is measured in units of 
$10,000.  I also create a dummy variable, income increase indicator, which is coded one 
when a player has to receive an income increase and zero when a player does not have to 
receive an income increase.  Income increase is expected to have a negative impact on 
firm tenure and career length because it also increases the team’s marginal cost without 
increasing the team’s marginal revenue. 
In both the firm tenure and career length analyses I include variables to control for 
a player’s non-salary compensation.  I control for the player’s non-salary compensation 
because this allows me to control for the seasons when players receive small base salaries 
but a large amount of compensation in the form of bonuses.  Even though some players 
receive large bonuses at various points throughout their careers, the player’s salary in the 
years following a large bonus must be at least the minimum salary corresponding to the 
year and the player’s experience level.  This is important because when the value of the 
player’s productivity falls below the mandated minimum salary the team will still have an 
incentive to release the player regardless of the size of bonuses in previous seasons.  This 
study uses American football data, so the details of the statistics used to measure 
productivity in that sport are relevant.  What follows is an introduction to the specialized 
positions and statistics used in American football.  This will be very familiar to 
established fans of the sport. 
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The explanatory variables I choose to control for player productivity for the 
defensive positions, defensive backs, defensive linemen, and linebackers are games 
played, games started, tackles, sacks, passes defended, interceptions, and forced fumbles.  
Games played represents the number of games a player plays in a season.  Games played 
is expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length because players 
who play in the game at a given position are typically perceived to be better players by 
the coaches than players who do not play in the game.  Games started represents the 
number of games a player plays at the beginning of the game for his given position.  
Games started are expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length 
because the players who start are typically perceived to be better players by the coaches 
than the players who do not start.  Tackles are defined as the total number of times a 
player tackles an opponent during a season.  Sacks are defined as the total number of 
times a player tackles the quarterback behind the line of scrimmage during a season.  
Passes defended are defined as the total number of times a player breaks up a pass thrown 
by the quarterback.  Interceptions are defined as the total number of times a defensive 
player catches a pass thrown by the quarterback.  Forced fumbles are defined as the total 
number of times a defensive player causes an offensive player to lose the football.  
Tackles, sacks, passes defended, interceptions, and forced fumbles are expected to have a 
positive impact on firm tenure and career length because they measure the impact of the 
player’s ability to help his team stop their opponent from scoring.      
The explanatory variables I choose to control for player productivity for the 
offensive positions, running backs, tight ends, and wide receivers are games played, 
games started, touches, yards, touchdowns, fumbles, and fumbles lost.  Touches are 
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defined as the sum of a player’s rushing attempts and receptions.  Touches account for 
the number of opportunities a player has to gain yards.  Touches are expected to have a 
negative impact on firm tenure and career length because holding all other covariates 
constant, an additional touch is simply another opportunity for a player to get injured.  
Yards are defined as the sum of a player’s rushing and receiving yards.  Yards are 
expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length because they measure 
the impact of the player’s ability to help the team get closer to a scoring opportunity.  
Touchdowns are defined as the sum of a player’s rushing and receiving touchdowns.  
Touchdowns are expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length 
because they measure the impact of the player’s ability to help the team score points.  
Fumbles represents the number of times a player has possession of the football and loses 
possession.  Fumbles are expected to have a negative impact on firm tenure and career 
length because they allow the other team an opportunity to gain possession of the 
football.  Fumbles lost are expected to have a negative impact on firm tenure and career 
length because they represent the number of times a player has possession of the football, 
loses possession, and the other team gains possession.   
The explanatory variables I choose to control for the team are win percentage, 
playoff appearance, and millions under the salary cap.  The winning percentage 
represents the percentage of games a team wins in a given year.  Winning percentage is 
expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length because teams with 
higher winning percentages appear to be more likely to keep the same composition of 
players from year to year.  Playoff appearance is a dummy variable that is coded one 
when the team makes the playoffs and zero when the team does not make the playoffs.  
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Playoff appearance is expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length 
because teams that make the playoffs appear to be more likely to keep the same 
composition of players from year to year than teams that do not make the playoffs.    
Millions under the salary cap are the difference between the salary cap and the total 
payroll of a player’s team.  Due to the exception in the salary cap that allow veterans to 
receive the minimum salary up to 810,000 and only count $425,000 against the salary 
cap, a team’s total payroll is allowed to be larger than the salary cap value without 
incurring a penalty.  Millions under the salary cap are expected to have a positive impact 
on firm tenure and career length because the more a team is under the salary cap, the 
more money they are allowed to spend on players.  
The explanatory variables I choose to control for non-salary compensation are 
signing bonus, other bonuses, and pension eligibility.  The signing bonus is a bonus a 
player receives when he signs a new contract with a team.  Signing bonus is expected to 
have a positive impact on firm tenure and career length because teams are likely to give 
larger signing bonuses to players they expect to be top performers.  Other bonuses 
typically are bonuses given to players when they achieve a specific goal outlined in their 
contract.  Other bonuses are expected to have a positive impact on firm tenure and career 
length because players who receive other bonuses are meeting criteria that the team 
requires them to meet in order to receive additional compensation.  Pension eligibility is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a player is eligible for the pension plan.  NFL players 
are eligible for the pension plan after they earn four credited seasons.  Pension eligibility 
can be coded as a dummy variable for four or more credited seasons or can be included in 
the time dependence, as it depends perfectly on time.  The impact of pension eligibility is 
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ambiguous because once players are eligible for the pension plan they could either retire 
or play longer to increase their pension benefits.   
The explanatory variables I choose to control for demographic information are 
height, weight, and age at the beginning of the career.  The impact of height on firm 
tenure and career length is ambiguous because taller players are able to see over shorter 
players but they are more susceptible to having their legs hit.  Weight is expected to have 
a positive impact on firm tenure and career length because heavier players are likely to 
absorb contact better than lighter players.  Age at the beginning of the career is expected 
to have a negative impact on firm tenure and career length because older players who 
enter the NFL are likely to have suffered from the wear and tear of additional college 
seasons. 
The explanatory variables I choose to control for the number of teams a player 
plays for are a set of dummy variables indicating whether a player is on his second team, 
third team, fourth team, fifth team, sixth team, or seventh team during a given season.  I 
expect the impact of these variables to be negative compared to players on their first team 
because these players have already played for and left at least one other team, shortening 
their expected firm tenure on their next team. 
2.4.2 Summary Statistics   
Tables 2.1 through 2.6 display the defensive backs, defensive linemen, 
linebackers, running backs, tight ends, and wide receivers summary statistics for the 
covariates used in the firm tenure analysis and the seasons played variable.  The seasons 
played variable in the firm tenure sample identifies which season a player is in during his 
tenure with a specific team.  The average of the current seasons played variable is not the 
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same as the average number of seasons played by a player for a specific firm.  Some of 
the data used in the firm tenure analyses are right-censored.  The hazard model utilizes all 
of the observations, right-censored or complete spells.  I have 1270 defensive back player 
years in the firm tenure sample because there are typically four defensive backs playing 
in a game at a time and occasionally there are five or six.  I have 970 defensive linemen 
player years in the firm tenure sample because there are typically four defensive linemen 
playing in a game at a time.  I have 871 linebacker player years in the firm tenure sample 
because there are typically three linebackers playing in a game at a time.  I have 707 
running back player years in the firm tenure sample because there are typically two 
running backs playing in a game at a time.  I have 350 tight end player years in the firm 
tenure sample because there is typically one tight end playing in a game at a time.  I have 
682 wide receiver player years in the firm tenure sample because there are typically two 
wide receivers playing in a game at a time and occasionally there are three, four, or five.  
Players included in the firm tenure sample are players who began their tenures with a 
team between 2000 and 2008.  Players who play for more than one team in a season or 
have a skipped season in the data are not included in the firm tenure analyses. 
Some of these players began their careers prior to the 2000 season but they are 
included in the firm tenure sample as long as their first season with a new team occurred 
between 2000 and 2008.  Even if a player enters the NFL in 1990, only the seasons for 
the teams in which his firm tenure is not left-censored are included in the sample.  A 
specific player’s firm tenure may appear in this sample as many times as he move to a 
new team and the firm tenure is not left-censored (i.e. the beginning of the spell is always 
observed). 
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Generally speaking, in the firm tenure samples, about 62% of players have a 
mandatory raise, so only 38% earn salaries greater than their next mandated minimum 
salary.  An income increase is required by over 30%, so less than 70% earn more income 
than their next mandated minimum salary. Teams win, of course, exactly 50% of their 
games, but the average for the average for the firm tenure samples deviates slightly from 
that number.  Similarly, 37.5% of teams make the playoffs (12 out of 32 each year), but 
the average for the average for the firm tenure samples deviates slightly from that 
number.  There are some differences between positions in average salary, average 
increase in salary, height and weight, as detailed in following paragraphs. 
In the defensive back firm tenure sample, the average of the seasons played 
variable is 2.3.  A mandatory raise is required by 62.3% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $51,310.  An income increase is required by 31.5% sample.  The 
average income increase is $23,010.  Players, on average, have 13.1 games played, 7.5 
games started, 42.3 tackles, 0.3 sacks, 4.7 passes defended, 1.5 interceptions, and 0.5 
forced fumbles.  Pension eligibility is attained by 35.2%, 22.7% are on their second team, 
7.6% are on their third team, 2.5% are on their fourth team, 0.9% are on their fifth team, 
0.3% are on their sixth team, and 0.1% are on their seventh team.  Teams, on average, 
win 50.6% of their games, make the playoffs 37.0% of the time, and are $2.4 million 
under the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $924,740 and other 
bonuses of $274,910.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.5.  The 
average height is 71.6 inches and the average weight is 200.4 pounds.   
In the defensive linemen firm tenure sample, the average of the seasons played 
variable is 2.4.  A mandatory raise is required by 56.0% of the sample.  The average 
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mandatory raise is $46,430.  An income increase is required by 27.1% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $19,350.  Players, on average, have 12.9 games played, 
7.9 games started, 28.4 tackles, 2.7 sacks, 1.4 passes defended, 0.09 interceptions, and 0.7 
forced fumbles.  Pension eligibility is attained by 41.4%, 23.3% are on their second team, 
8.1% are on their third team, 3.5% are on their fourth team, 0.6% are on their fifth team, 
0.3% are on their sixth team, and 0.4% are on their seventh team.  Teams, on average, 
win 50.7% of their games, make the playoffs 36.9% of the time, and are $2.7 million 
under the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $1,205,240 and 
other bonuses of $341,730.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.6.  
The average height is 75.6 inches and the average weight is 294.4 pounds. 
In the linebacker firm tenure sample, the average of the current seasons played 
variable is 2.3.  A mandatory raise is required by 62.0% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $52,220.  An income increase is required by 32.5% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $23,790.  Players, on average, have 13.2 games played, 
7.5 games started, 52.2 tackles, 1.2 sacks, 1.9 passes defended, 0.5 interceptions, and 0.7 
forced fumbles.  Pension eligibility is attained by 37.8%, 23.3% are on their second team, 
7.8% are on their third team, 2.5% are on their fourth team, and 0.7% are on their fifth 
team.  Teams, on average, win 50.1% of their games, make the playoffs 37.2% of the 
time, and are $3.2 million under the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing 
bonus of $885,630 and other bonuses of $221,230.  The average age at the beginning of 
the NFL career is 22.6.  The average height is 73.8 inches and the average weight is 
240.7 pounds. 
 
29 
In the running back firm tenure sample, the average of the current seasons played 
variable is 2.3.  A mandatory raise is required by 62.1% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $54,540.  An income increase is required by 37.3% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $29,010.  Players, on average, have 11.9 games played, 
4.7 games started, 96.7 touches, 456.5 yards, 2.9 touchdowns, 1.2 fumbles, and 0.7 
fumbles lost.  Pension eligibility is attained by 38.3%, 23.9% are on their second team, 
6.5% are on their third team, 2.7% are on their fourth team, 0.8% are on their fifth team, 
0.7% are on their sixth team, and 0.1% are on their seventh team.  Teams, on average, 
win 49.1% of their games, make the playoffs 34.9% of the time, and are $2.5 million 
under the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $704,850 and other 
bonuses of $267,540.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.5.  The 
average height is 71.3 inches and the average weight is 225.3 pounds. 
In the tight end firm tenure sample, the average of the current seasons played 
variable is 2.5.  A mandatory raise is required by 60.6% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $50,570.  An income increase is required by 32.3% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $24,740.  Players, on average, have 12.5 games played, 
7.1 games started, 22.0 touches, 231.4 yards, 1.9 touchdowns, 0.3 fumbles, and 0.2 
fumbles lost.  Pension eligibility is attained by 35.1%, 18.6% are on their second team, 
3.7% are on their third team, 1.7% are on their fourth team, and 0.6% are on their fifth 
team.  Teams, on average, win 52.0% of their games, make the playoffs 40.9% of the 
time, and are $2.4 million under the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing 
bonus of $739,310 and other bonuses of $189,950.  The average age at the beginning of 
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the NFL career is 22.8.  The average height is 76.2 inches and the average weight is 
255.2 pounds. 
In the wide receiver firm tenure sample, the average of the current seasons played 
variable is 2.2.  A mandatory raise is required by 63.2% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $51,380.  An income increase is required by 31.7% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $23,190.  Players, on average, have 12.2 games played, 
6.0 games started, 32.1 touches, 332.0 yards, 2.4 touchdowns, 0.8 fumbles, and 0.4 
fumbles lost.  Pension eligibility is attained by 33.1%, 17.3% are on their second team, 
7.0% are on their third team, 2.2% are on their fourth team, 1.3% are on their fifth team, 
and 0.1% are on their sixth team.  Teams, on average, win 49.7% of their games, make 
the playoffs 37.0% of the time, and are $2.7 million under the salary cap.  Players, on 
average, receive a signing bonus of $1,132,730 and other bonuses of $334,190.  The 
average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.5.  The average height is 72.9 inches 
and the average weight is 201.3 pounds. 
Tables 2.7 through 2.12 display the defensive backs, defensive linemen, 
linebackers, running backs, tight ends, and wide receivers summary statistics for the 
covariates used in the career length analysis and the seasons played variable.  The 
seasons played variable in the career length sample identifies which season a player is in 
during his career in the NFL.  The average of the current seasons played variable is not 
the same as the average number of seasons played by a player during his career.  Some of 
the data used in the career length analyses are right-censored.  The hazard model utilizes 
all observations when estimating the baseline hazard and coefficients.  I have 957 
defensive back player years in the career length sample because there are typically four 
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defensive backs playing in a game at a time and occasionally there are five or six.  I have 
729 defensive linemen player years in the career length sample because there are 
typically four defensive linemen playing in a game at a time.  I have 670 linebacker 
player years in the career length sample because there are typically three linebackers 
playing in a game at a time.  I have 526 running back player years in the career length 
sample because there are typically two running backs playing in a game at a time.  I have 
285 tight end player years in the career length sample because there is typically one tight 
end playing in a game at a time.  I have 567 wide receiver player years in the career 
length sample because there are typically two wide receivers playing in a game at a time 
and occasionally there are three, four, or five.  Players included in the career length 
sample are players who began their careers with a team between 2000 and 2008.  None of 
the observations in the career length sample are left censored.  The number of player 
years in the firm tenure analyses is greater than the number of player years in the career 
length analyses for each position because players who careers started prior to the 2000 
season who had firm tenures that started after the 2000 season are included in the firm 
tenure samples but not the career length samples.  Players who play for more than one 
team in a season or have a skipped season in the data are not included in the career length 
analyses.   
Generally speaking, in the career length samples, over 64% of players have a 
mandatory raise, so less than 36% earn salaries greater than their next mandated 
minimum salary.  An income increase is required by over 31%, so less than 69% earn 
more income than their next mandated minimum salary.  Teams win, of course, exactly 
50% of their games, but the average for the career length samples deviate slightly from 
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that number.  Similarly, 37.5% of teams make the playoffs (12 out of 32 each year), but 
the average for the career length samples deviates slightly from that number.  There are 
some differences between positions in average salary, average increase in salary, height 
and weight, for the career length samples as detailed in following paragraphs. 
In the defensive back career length sample, the average of the current seasons 
played variable is 2.9.  A mandatory raise is required by 71.8% of the sample.  The 
average mandatory raise is $58,540.  An income increase is required by 35.7% of the 
sample.  The average income increase is $25,560.  Players, on average, have 13.1 games 
played, 7.1 games started, 42.2 tackles, 0.3 sacks, 4.9 passes defended, 1.4 interceptions, 
and 0.5 forced fumbles.  Pension eligibility is attained by 18.5%.  Teams, on average, win 
51.1% of their games, make the playoffs 38.8% of the time, and are $3.1 million under 
the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $930,340 and other 
bonuses of $270,729.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.6.  The 
average height is 71.7 inches and the average weight is 200.4 pounds.   
In the defensive linemen career length sample, the average of the current seasons 
played variable is 3.2.  A mandatory raise is required by 64.9% of the sample.  The 
average mandatory raise is $53,280.  An income increase is required by 31.8% of the 
sample.  The average income increase is $23,070.  Players, on average, have 12.9 games 
played, 7.4 games started, 29.1 tackles, 2.7 sacks, 1.4 passes defended, 0.09 interceptions, 
and 0.7 forced fumbles.  Pension eligibility is attained by 25.0%.  Teams, on average, win 
51.0% of their games, make the playoffs 38.0% of the time, and are $3.2 million under 
the salary cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $1,182,630 and other 
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bonuses of $352,720.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.6.  The 
average height is 75.6 inches and the average weight is 295.4 pounds. 
In the linebacker career length sample, the average of the current seasons played 
variable is 3.1.  A mandatory raise is required by 70.3% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $56,930.  An income increase is required by 35.8% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $25,500.  Players, on average, have 13.2 games played, 
7.4 games started, 52.9 tackles, 1.2 sacks, 2.0 passes defended, 0.5 interceptions, and 0.7 
forced fumbles.  Pension eligibility is attained by 22.4%.  Teams, on average, win 50.4% 
of their games, make the playoffs 38.4% of the time, and are $3.5 million under the salary 
cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $876,630 and other bonuses of 
$256,870.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.6.  The average 
height is 73.8 inches and the average weight is 240.1 pounds. 
In the running back career length sample, the average of the current seasons 
played variable is 3.0.  A mandatory raise is required by 72.2% of the sample.  The 
average mandatory raise is $61,050.  An income increase is required by 41.3% of the 
sample.  The average income increase is $32,310.  Players, on average, have 12.1 games 
played, 4.4 games started, 95.9 touches, 454.7 yards, 2.9 touchdowns, 1.2 fumbles, and 
0.7 fumbles lost.  Pension eligibility is attained by 21.9%.  Teams, on average, win 48.8% 
of their games, make the playoffs 34.2% of the time, and are $2.5 million under the salary 
cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $758,740 and other bonuses of 
$281,400.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.6.  The average 
height is 71.2 inches and the average weight is 225.5 pounds. 
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In the tight end career length sample, the average of the current seasons played 
variable is 3.1.  A mandatory raise is required by 64.2% of the sample.  The average 
mandatory raise is $52,840.  An income increase is required by 34.7% of the sample.  
The average income increase is $26,190.  Players, on average, have 12.7 games played, 
7.1 games started, 23.1 touches, 244.1 yards, 1.9 touchdowns, 0.4 fumbles, and 0.2 
fumbles lost.  Pension eligibility is attained by 24.6%.  Teams, on average, win 52.4% of 
their games, make the playoffs 41.4% of the time, and are $2.7 million under the salary 
cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $805,820 and other bonuses of 
$227,730.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.7.  The average 
height is 76.1 inches and the average weight is 255.7 pounds. 
In the wide receiver career length sample, the average of the current seasons 
played variable is 2.9.  A mandatory raise is required by 70.7% of the sample.  The 
average mandatory raise is $58,500.  An income increase is required by 35.3% of the 
sample.  The average income increase is $26,120.  Players, on average, have 12.0 games 
played, 5.6 games started, 30.6 touches, 313.6 yards, 2.3 touchdowns, 0.8 fumbles, and 
0.4 fumbles lost.  Pension eligibility is attained by 21.2%.  Teams, on average, win 49.1% 
of their games, make the playoffs 36.0% of the time, and are $2.9 million under the salary 
cap.  Players, on average, receive a signing bonus of $805,820 and other bonuses of 
$227,730.  The average age at the beginning of the NFL career is 22.4.  The average 
height is 72.9 inches and the average weight is 201.6 pounds. 
Tables 2.13 through 2.24 provide detailed information on the percentage of 
players who require a mandatory raise or an income increase in the firm tenure samples.  
A player requires a mandatory raise when his year t salary is less than his year t+1 
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mandated minimum salary.  A player requires a total income increase when the sum of 
his year t salary and bonuses is less than his year t+1 mandated minimum salary.  A large 
number of star players require a mandatory raise because they receive a large amount of 
their income in bonuses.  Only a few star players require a total income increase.  In the 
firm tenure samples, players who require a mandatory raise or a total income increase 
have fewer average games played, games started, tackles, sacks, passes defended, 
interceptions, forced fumbles, touches, yards, fumbles, and fumbles lost than the players 
who do not require a mandatory raise or an income increase. In the firm tenure samples, 
players who require a mandatory raise or an income increase also have lower average 
bonuses than the players who do not require a mandatory raise or an income increase.  In 
tables 2.13 through 2.24 I show the percentage of players in the firm tenure samples 
requiring a mandatory raise and an income increase that is greater than $0, greater than 
$50,000, greater than $75,000, and greater than $100,000.  These tables provide the 
reader with more information about the size and frequency of mandatory raises and 
income increases.  There are some differences between positions in the size and 
frequency of mandatory raises and income increases for the firm tenure samples as 
detailed in following paragraphs.   
Table 2.13 displays the percentage of defensive backs requiring a mandatory raise 
for the firm tenure sample:  62.4% require a mandatory raise, 55.5% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 41.6% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
12.2% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.14 displays the 
percentage of defensive backs requiring an income increase for the firm tenure sample:  
31.5% require an income increase, 26.4% require an income increase greater than 
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$50,000, 14.5% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 4.6% require an 
income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.15 displays the percentage of defensive linemen requiring a mandatory 
raise for the firm tenure sample:  56.0% require a mandatory raise, 49.5% require a 
mandatory raise greater than $50,000, 37.4% require a mandatory raise greater than 
$75,000, and 12.1% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.16 displays 
the percentage of defensive linemen requiring an income increase for the firm tenure 
sample:  27.1% require an income increase, 21.6% require an income increase greater 
than $50,000, 12.5% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 4.7% require 
an income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.17 displays the percentage of linebackers requiring a mandatory raise for 
the firm tenure sample:  62.0% require a mandatory raise, 55.7% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 41.2% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
13.3% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.18 displays the 
percentage of linebackers requiring an income increase for the firm tenure sample:  
32.5% require an income increase, 27.8% require an income increase greater than 
$50,000, 15.8% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 5.3% require an 
income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.19 displays the percentage of running backs requiring a mandatory raise 
for the firm tenure sample:  63.1% require a mandatory raise, 58.3% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 46.0% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
15.0% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.20 displays the 
percentage of running backs requiring an income increase for the firm tenure sample:  
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37.3% require an income increase, 32.8% require an income increase greater than 
$50,000, 21.9% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 7.2% require an 
income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.21 displays the percentage of tight ends requiring a mandatory raise for 
the firm tenure sample:  60.6% require a mandatory raise, 54.3% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 41.7% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
12.0% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.22 displays the 
percentage of tight ends requiring an income increase for the firm tenure sample:  32.3% 
require an income increase, 28.9% require an income increase greater than $50,000, 
17.1% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 5.7% require an income 
increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.23 displays the percentage of wide receivers requiring a mandatory raise 
for the firm tenure sample:  63.2% require a mandatory raise, 55.6% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 43.0% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
12.8% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.24 displays the 
percentage of wide receivers requiring an income increase for the firm tenure sample:  
31.7% require an income increase, 26.0% require an income increase greater than 
$50,000, 16.3% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 5.4% require an 
income increase greater than $100,000. 
Tables 2.25 through 2.36 provide detailed information on the percentage of 
players who require a mandatory raise or an income increase in the career length samples.  
In the career length samples, players who require a mandatory raise or a total income 
increase have fewer average games played, games started, tackles, sacks, passes 
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defended, interceptions, forced fumbles, touches, yards, fumbles, and fumbles lost than 
the players who do not require a mandatory raise or an income increase. In the career 
length samples, players who require a mandatory raise or an income increase also have 
lower average bonuses than the players who do not require a mandatory raise or an 
income increase.  In tables 2.25 through 2.36 I show the percentage of players in the firm 
tenure samples requiring a mandatory raise and an income increase that is greater than 
$0, greater than $50,000, greater than $75,000, and greater than $100,000.  These tables 
provide the reader with more information about the size and frequency of mandatory 
raises and income increases.  There are some differences between positions in the size 
and frequency of mandatory raises and income increases for the career length samples as 
detailed in following paragraphs. 
Table 2.25 displays the percentage of defensive backs requiring a mandatory raise 
for the career length sample:  71.8% require a mandatory raise, 66.5% require a 
mandatory raise greater than $50,000, 49.2% require a mandatory raise greater than 
$75,000, and 13.1% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.26 displays 
the percentage of defensive backs requiring an income increase for the career length 
sample:  35.7% require an income increase, 30.2% require an income increase greater 
than $50,000, 16.3% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 5.1% require 
an income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.27 displays the percentage of defensive linemen requiring a mandatory 
raise for the career length sample:  64.9% require a mandatory raise, 59.5% require a 
mandatory raise greater than $50,000, 44.3% require a mandatory raise greater than 
$75,000, and 12.5% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000.  Table 2.28 
 
39 
displays the percentage of defensive linemen requiring an income increase for the career 
length sample:  31.8% require an income increase, 26.5% require an income increase 
greater than $50,000, 15.0% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 5.5% 
require an income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.29 displays the percentage of linebackers requiring a mandatory raise for 
the career length sample:  70.3% require a mandatory raise, 64.6% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 46.7% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
12.4% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.30 displays the 
percentage of linebackers requiring an income increase for the career length sample:  
35.8% require an income increase, 31.0% require an income increase greater than 
$50,000, 17.2% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 4.9% require an 
income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.31 displays the percentage of running backs requiring a mandatory raise 
for the career length sample:  72.2% require a mandatory raise, 68.6% require a 
mandatory raise greater than $50,000, 52.7% require a mandatory raise greater than 
$75,000, and 15.4% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.32 displays 
the percentage of running backs requiring an income increase for the career length 
sample:  41.3% require an income increase, 38.4% require an income increase greater 
than $50,000, 24.9% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 8.0% require 
an income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.33 displays the percentage of tight ends requiring a mandatory raise for 
the career length sample:  64.2% require a mandatory raise, 59.3% require a mandatory 
raise greater than $50,000, 44.2% require a mandatory raise greater than $75,000, and 
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11.6% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.34 displays the 
percentage of tight ends requiring an income increase for the career length sample:  
34.7% require an income increase, 31.2% require an income increase greater than 
$50,000, 17.9% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 5.6% require an 
income increase greater than $100,000. 
Table 2.35 displays the percentage of wide receivers requiring a mandatory raise 
for the career length sample:  70.7% require a mandatory raise, 65.1% require a 
mandatory raise greater than $50,000, 50.1% require a mandatory raise greater than 
$75,000, and 14.3% require a mandatory raise greater than $100,000. Table 2.36 displays 
the percentage of wide receivers requiring an income increase for the career length 
sample:  35.3% require an income increase, 29.8% require an income increase greater 
than $50,000, 18.7% require an income increase greater than $75,000, and 6.3% require 
an income increase greater than $100,000. 
2.4.3 Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates 
 The Kaplan Meier survival estimates used in this analysis estimate the probability 
of a player’s survival past a certain time.  Figures 2.1 through 2.12 show the Kaplan 
Meier survival estimates for the firm tenure sample for all six positions.  The survival 
estimates are split by whether a player never required a mandatory raise and by whether a 
player never required an income increase.  Players who require a mandatory raise have a 
higher survival rate with a given firm than players who do not require a mandatory raise 
for all six positions.  This is an unexpected result because one would expect that if the 
salary structure is forcing the firm to give the worker a raise, firm tenure is shortened.  
This result could be driven by the fact that some star players receive the minimum salary 
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and receive the rest of their compensation in the form of bonuses.  This result could also 
be driven by the fact that these Kaplan Meier survival estimates are only controlling for 
whether a player receive a mandatory raise.  Players who require an income increase have 
a lower survival rate with a given firm than players who never require an income increase 
for all six positions.  These results are exactly what one expects when the salary structure 
forces a firm to increase a worker’s income without an increase in productivity.  Without 
controlling for any covariates other than mandatory raise and income increase, these 
Kaplan Meier survival estimates provide evidence that players who are required by 
minimum salaries to receive an income increase have shorter tenures with a given team. 
 Figures 2.13 through 2.24 show the Kaplan Meier survival estimates for the career 
length sample for all six positions.  The survival estimates are split by whether a player 
never required a mandatory raise and by whether a player never required an income 
increase.  Players who require a mandatory raise have a lower survival rate during their 
careers than players who never require a mandatory raise for all six positions.  Players 
who require an income increase also have a lower survival rate during their careers than 
players never require an income increase for all six positions.  These results are also 
exactly what one expects when the salary structure forces a firm to increase a worker’s 
salary and total income without an increase in productivity.  Without controlling for any 
covariates other than mandatory raise and income increase, these Kaplan Meier survival 
estimates provide evidence that players who are required by minimum salaries to receive 
a mandatory raise or an income increase have shorter careers. 
 
42 
2.5 Results 
I estimate four basic models for each position’s firm tenure sample.  Two models 
(labeled (1) and (3) in the tables) use the indicator for mandatory raise and income 
increase as the variable of interest.  Models (2) and (4) use the values of mandatory raise 
and income increase in $10,000s as the variable of interest.  Table 2.37 through 2.42 
display the Weibull regression results for the firm tenure sample for all six positions.  
Mandatory raise indicator is negative and statistically significant for only tight ends and 
wide receivers.  It is negative and statistically insignificant for defensive linemen, 
linebackers, and running backs.   It is positive and statistically insignificant for defensive 
backs.  Mandatory raise in $10,000s is negative and statistically significant for only wide 
receivers.  It is negative and statistically insignificant for defensive linemen, linebackers, 
running backs, and tight ends.   It is positive and statistically insignificant for defensive 
backs.  Income increase indicator is negative and statistically significant for defensive 
linemen, linebackers, running backs, and tight ends.  It is negative and statistically 
insignificant for defensive backs and wide receivers.   Income increase in $10,000s is 
negative and statistically significant for defensive linemen, linebackers, and wide 
receivers.  It is negative and statistically insignificant for defensive backs, running backs, 
and tight ends.   Most of the control variables in the firm tenure analyses had the expected 
sign even though some were statistically insignificant.  All of the variables that are 
statistically significant in the firm tenure samples have the expected sign except for 
games started for defensive backs, linebackers, and wide receivers.  The signs and the 
statistical significance of the variables of interest in tables 2.37 through 2.42 provide 
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evidence that minimum salaries shorten firm tenure for all positions except for defensive 
backs.   
The coefficient in the tight ends sample indicates that a tight end who receives a 
mandatory raise has his firm tenure shortened by 0.99 of a season.  The coefficient in the 
defensive linemen sample indicates that a defensive lineman who receives an income 
increase has his firm tenure shortened by 0.65 of a season.  The coefficient in the 
defensive linemen sample indicates that a defensive lineman’s firm tenure is shortened by 
an additional 0.10 of a season when income increase in $10,000s increase by $10,000.   
The games played variable is statistically significant for running backs, tight ends, 
and wide receivers.  The games started variable is statistically significant for defensive 
backs, linebackers, running backs and wide receivers.  The tackles variable is statistically 
significant for defensive linemen and linebackers.  The sacks variable is statistically 
significant for defensive backs.  The passes defended variable is statistically significant 
for defensive backs.  The interceptions variable is statistically significant for defensive 
backs and linebackers.  The forced fumbles variable is statistically significant for 
linebackers.  The touches variable is statistically significant for running backs and tight 
ends.  The yards variable is statistically significant for running backs, tight ends, and 
wide receivers.  The touchdowns variable is statistically significant for wide receivers.   
The pension eligibility variable is statistically significant for running backs.  The 
second team, third team, fourth team, and fifth team variables are statistically significant 
for all positions.  The sixth team variable is statistically significant for defensive backs, 
defensive linemen, and wide receivers.  The seventh team variable is statistically 
significant for defensive backs, defensive linemen, and running backs.  The win 
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percentage variable is statistically significant for linebackers and wide receivers.  The 
signing bonus variable is statistically significant for all positions.  The other bonuses 
variable is statistically significant for defensive backs, defensive linemen, and wide 
receivers.  The age at the beginning of the career variable is statistically significant for 
defensive backs, linebackers, and wide receivers.  The weight variable is statistically 
significant for defensive linemen and linebackers. 
The results for the defensive backs firm tenure sample for models (1) and (2) are 
inconsistent with expectations.  One possible explanation for why a mandatory raise 
increases firm tenure is that the majority of defensive backs who require a mandatory 
raise are players who receive a large part of their compensation in the form of bonuses.  If 
a player earns the minimum salary but receives the majority of his compensation in 
bonuses, he will require a mandatory raise but his value to the team could be higher than 
his next minimum salary.  Another explanation for why a mandatory raise increases firm 
tenure is that defensive backs who require a mandatory raise may be worth the next 
minimum salary to their current team but not to any other team in the league. 
The player performance measures games played, games started, tackles, sacks, 
passes defended, interceptions, and forced fumbles are included in the models for 
defensive players to account for productivity.  The player performance measures games 
played, games started, touches, yards, touchdowns, fumbles, and fumbles lost are 
included in the models for offensive players to account for productivity.  The team 
performance measures win percentage and playoff appearance variables account for any 
team synergies that occur from the combination of a specific group of players.  These two 
sets of variables together capture the impact of productivity on a player’s firm tenure.  
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The statistical insignificance of some variables and the unexpected sign of the games 
started variable could be due to the fact that some of these variables might be collinear.  
In this analysis, it is okay if the variables are collinear because the main goal of including 
these variables is to account for productivity.  If someone is interested in specific 
performance measures they would need to be more careful with the specification.   
I estimate four basic models for each position’s career length sample.  Two models 
(labeled (1) and (3) in the tables) use the indicator for mandatory raise and income 
increase as the variable of interest.  Models (2) and (4) use the values of mandatory raise 
and income increase in $10,000s as the variable of interest.  Tables 2.43 through 2.48 
display the Weibull regression results for the career length sample for all six positions.  
Mandatory raise indicator is negative and statistically significant for defensive backs, 
defensive linemen, and running backs.  It is negative and statistically insignificant for 
linebackers, tight ends, and wide receivers.   Mandatory raise in $10,000s is negative and 
statistically significant for defensive backs, defensive linemen, running backs, and wide 
receivers.  It is negative and statistically insignificant for linebackers and tight ends.   
Income increase indicator and income increase in $10,000s are negative and statistically 
significant for defensive backs, defensive linemen, linebackers, and running backs.  They 
are both negative and statistically insignificant for tight ends and wide receivers.  Most of 
the control variables in the career length analyses had the expected sign even though 
some were statistically insignificant.  All of the variables that are statistically significant 
in the career length samples have the expected sign except for games started and playoff 
appearance.  The signs and the statistical significance of the variables of interest in tables 
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2.43 through 2.48 provide evidence that minimum salaries shorten career length for all 
positions except for tight ends and wide receivers.   
The coefficient in the defensive backs sample indicates that a defensive back who 
receives a mandatory raise has his career length shortened by 2.26 seasons.  The 
coefficient in the defensive backs sample indicates that a defensive back’s career length 
is shortened by an additional 0.29 of a season when mandatory raise increases by 
$10,000.  The coefficient in the defensive backs sample indicates that a defensive back 
who receives an income increase has his career length shortened by 3.49 seasons.  The 
coefficient in the defensive backs sample indicates that a defensive back’s career length 
is shortened by an additional 0.44 of a season when income increase increases by 
$10,000.   
The games played variable is statistically significant for running backs, tight ends, 
and wide receivers.  The games started variable is statistically significant for linebackers.  
The tackles variable is statistically significant for defensive backs, defensive linemen, 
and linebackers.  The sacks variable is statistically significant for defensive linemen.  The 
passes defended variable is statistically significant for defensive backs.  The touches and 
yards variables are statistically significant for running backs.     
The pension eligibility variable is statistically significant for running backs and 
wide receivers.  The win percentage variable is statistically significant for defensive 
linemen and linebackers.  The playoff appearance variable is statistically significant for 
defensive linemen.  The signing bonus variable is statistically significant for wide 
receivers.  The other bonuses variable is statistically significant for defensive linemen.  
The age at the beginning of the career variable is statistically significant for all positions 
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except for linebackers and tight ends.  The height variable is statistically significant for 
defensive linemen, linebackers, and running backs.  The weight variable is statistically 
significant for defensive linemen and running backs. 
The coefficient on the win percentage variable appears to be unusually large 
because it indicates that a one unit change in win percentage will increase career length 
by twenty years.  The issue here is that the win percentage does not typically increase by 
an entire unit.  It is more realistic to think about a tenth of a point increase in win 
percentage.  A tenth of a point increase in win percentage leads to a 2.03 year increase in 
career length. 
The results for the tight ends career length sample for all four models appear to be 
improbable.  One thing to notice is that the p-values for the coefficients on all the 
explanatory variables are close to one, indicating that the estimates are imprecisely 
estimated.  One possible explanation for these results is that tight ends typically have the 
responsibilities of two positions, wide receivers and offensive linemen.  There are few 
tight ends that have touches, yards, and touchdowns that are similar to some of the most 
productive wide receivers.  The majority of tight ends have touches, yards, and 
touchdowns that are either close to zero or equal to zero because their function on a team 
is more like an offensive linemen.  I believe that it is these outliers that are driving these 
improbable results.   
The player performance measures and the team performance measures capture the 
impact of productivity on a player’s career length.  The statistical insignificance of some 
variables and the unexpected sign of the games started and playoff appearance variables 
could be due to the fact that some of these variables might be collinear.  In this analysis, 
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it is okay if the variables are collinear because the main goal of including these variables 
is to account for productivity.  If someone is interested in specific performance measures 
they would need to be more careful with the specification.   
In order to estimate the impact of the player performance measures and the team 
performance measures on firm tenure and career length, I perform a joint test of 
significance with the player performance measures and the team performance measures 
for each model.  Table 2.49 shows the results from the joint test of significance for the 
player and team performance measures in the firm tenure samples.  Table 2.50 shows the 
results from the joint test of significance for the player and team performance measures in 
the career length samples.  The Chi-square statistics and their corresponding p-values 
from the joint test are reported.  In each model estimated, the player and team 
performance measures are jointly significant at the 0.001% significance level.  These 
results show that even though individual player or team performance measures are 
statistically insignificant, the joint collection of these variables is statically significant 
indicating that collectively, they have predictive power.  The Chi-square statistics from 
the joint test of all the variables included in the model are larger than the Chi-square 
statistics from the joint test of the player and team performance measures.  The Chi-
square statistics from the joint test of the player and team performance measures are large 
enough to indicate that the joint test for all the variables is at least statistically significant 
at the 0.005% significant level even though the test for all the variables in the model has 
9 more degrees of freedom.   
Comparing the results from the firm tenure analyses to the career length analyses, 
the coefficients on the four variables of interest in the career length results have a larger 
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magnitude than the same variables in the firm tenure results.  Hence, the negative impact 
of mandatory raise indicator, mandatory raise in $10,000, income increase indicator, and 
income increase in $10,000 is larger in the career length analyses.  This is expected 
because careers are typically longer than tenures with specific teams.  Therefore, the 
potential for the minimum salary structure to shorten a career is greater than the potential 
for the minimum salary structure to shorten firm tenure.     
The Weibull Regression survival estimates used in this analysis estimate the 
probability of a player’s survival past a certain time controlling for all other covariates.  
Figures 2.25 through 2.36 show the Weibull Regression survival estimates for the firm 
tenure sample for all six positions.  These figures show the survival rate simulated by the 
hazard model for players who require a mandatory raise and for players who require an 
income increase.  Players who require a mandatory raise have a lower survival rate with a 
given firm than players who do not require a mandatory raise for all positions except for 
defensive backs.  Compared to the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates the results for the 
impact of mandatory raise on firm tenure change for all positions except for defensive 
backs.  Players who require an income increase have a lower survival rate with a given 
firm than players who do not require an income increase for all six positions.  These 
results are consistent with the results from the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.  
Controlling for other covariates, these Weibull regression survival estimates provide 
evidence that players who are required by minimum salaries to receive a mandatory raise 
or an income increase have shorter tenures with a given team. 
 Figures 2.37 through 2.48 show the Weibull regression survival estimates for the 
career length sample for all six positions.  These figures show the survival rate simulated 
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by the hazard model for players who require a mandatory raise and for players who 
require an income increase.  Players who require a mandatory raise have a lower survival 
rate during their careers than players who do not require a mandatory raise for all six 
positions.  Players who require an income increase also have a lower survival rate during 
their careers than players who do not require an income increase for all six positions.  
Both of these results are consistent with the results from the Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimates.  Controlling for other covariates, these Weibull regression survival estimates 
provide evidence that players who are required by minimum salaries to receive a 
mandatory raise or an income increase have shorter careers. 
2.6 Conclusion  
The fact that the mandatory raise variable and the income increase variable is 
negative and statistically significant for some of the positions provides evidence that 
minimum salaries have a negative impact on firm tenure and career length.  This study of 
minimum salaries on firm tenure and career length reveals that when the salary structure 
forces a firm to pay a worker more than the value of the worker to the firm, the worker’s 
firm tenure and career length are shortened.  These results have important implications 
for the NFL and other industries employing minimum salary schedules.   
The magnitude of the minimum salaries in the NFL is far greater than the 
magnitude of the minimum salaries in most other industries.  The market structure in the 
NFL differs from most other market structures that employ minimum salary schedules.  
The NFL only employs males but other industries with minimum salary schedules 
employ both males and females.  In spite of all of these differences between the NFL and 
any other industry that utilizes a minimum salary schedule, I argue that firm tenures and 
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career lengths will be shortened any time the employer has the ability to dismiss or fire 
workers and the salary structure forces the firm to pay the worker more than the value of 
the worker to the firm.  Therefore, any industry that has a minimum salary schedule in 
place should be aware that this salary structure has the ability to shorten firm tenures and 
career lengths of an employee when it forces the employer to pay the employee more 
than the employee’s value to the firm.   
Given that minimum salary schedules have the ability to shorten firm tenures and 
career lengths, they have the ability to give more players an opportunity to play in the 
NFL if older players’ careers end prematurely.  If some players’ careers are shortened 
due to the salary structure, other players who would not have had an opportunity to play 
in the NFL get a chance to play in the NFL.  If the goal of the NFL Management Council 
(the representative for owners) and the NFL Players Association (the representative for 
the players) is to increase the total number of players who have an opportunity to play in 
the NFL, minimum salaries are an effective policy tool.  If the goal of the NFL 
Management Council and the NFL Players Association is to put the best or more 
profitable players on the football field, minimum salaries are an ineffective policy tool.  
This is because minimum salaries force firms to replace productive players who would be 
profitable in the absence of the minimum schedule with less productive players who are 
only more profitable because of the presence of the minimum salary schedule. 
Two other potential drawbacks of this study are:  1) I do not control for injuries 
and 2) player performance measures and team performance measures are collinear.  The 
first potential drawback is not a serious problem for this study because injuries are mostly 
important when they cause players to miss games.  The fact that the player is injured is 
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not going to shorten a player’s career.  What shortens the player’s career is the fact that 
the player is injured and not able to perform at a level to warrant the coach putting him in 
the game.  When players are injured and do not miss games due to pain killer injections, 
intense rehab, or the ability to perform at a higher level than the next best player, the fact 
that the player is injured does not directly have an impact on firm tenure and career 
length.  The second potential drawback is not a serious problem for this study because 
even if player performance measures and team performance measures are collinear, as 
long as they collectively account for productivity they accomplish their objective for 
being included in the models.    
In many school districts, primary and secondary education teachers face a 
minimum salary schedule.  Unlike the NFL, in primary and secondary education it is 
difficult to fire employees if the value of their productivity is less than their mandated 
minimum salary.  There have been recent discussions about making it easier to fire 
teachers because of low student achievement.  If laws are put in place to make it easier to 
fire teachers, viable teachers’ careers may be shortened due to the minimum salary 
schedule.   One way to reduce the impact of minimum salary schedules shortening a 
teacher’s career is to allow some flexibility in the schedule once the teacher reaches a 
given level of level of experience.  Such flexibility could entail having one minimum 
salary for average teachers and another minimum salary for above- average teachers with 
a larger minimum for above average teachers.  Similar flexibility in the NFL’s minimum 
salary structure and other industries that employ minimum salary structures can reduce 
the negative impact of minimum salary schedules on career length.   
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Figure 2.1:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by Mandatory 
Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.3:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by Mandatory 
Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.5:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Mandatory Raise 
(Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.6:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Income Increase 
(Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.7:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Running Backs by Mandatory 
Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.8:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Running Backs by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.9:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Mandatory Raise 
(Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.10:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Income Increase 
(Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.11:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by Mandatory 
Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.12:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.13:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by Mandatory 
Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.14:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.15:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by 
Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.17:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Mandatory 
Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.18:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Income Increase 
(Career Length) 
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Figure 2.19:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Running Backs by Mandatory 
Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.20:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Running Backs by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.21:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Mandatory Raise 
(Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.22:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Income Increase 
(Career Length) 
 
  
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
E
st
im
at
ed
 S
ur
vi
va
l P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Season
MANDATORY_RAISE = 0 MANDATORY_RAISE = 1
Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by Mandatory Raise
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
0.
80
1.
00
E
st
im
at
ed
 S
ur
vi
va
l P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Season
INCOME_INCREASE = 0 INCOME_INCREASE = 1
Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by Income Increase
 
64 
Figure 2.23:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by Mandatory 
Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.24:  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.25:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by 
Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.26:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.27:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by 
Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.28:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by 
Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.29:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Mandatory 
Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.30:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.31:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Running Backs by 
Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.32:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Running Backs by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.33:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Mandatory 
Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.34:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.35:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by 
Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
 
 
Figure 2.36:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by Income 
Increase (Firm Tenure) 
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Figure 2.37:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by 
Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.38:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Backs by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.39:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by 
Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.40:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Defensive Linemen by 
Income Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.41:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Mandatory 
Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.42:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Linebackers by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.43:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Running Backs by 
Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.44:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Running Backs by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.45:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Mandatory 
Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.46:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Tight Ends by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Figure 2.47:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by 
Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
 
 
Figure 2.48:  Weibull Regression Survival Estimates for Wide Receivers by Income 
Increase (Career Length) 
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Table 2.1:  Defensive Backs Summary Statistics (Firm Tenure) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.324 1.517 1.898 1.059 3.029 1.861 2.023 1.015 2.463 1.682 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.623 0.485 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.450 0.498 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.131 4.806 8.233 3.391 0.000 0.000 8.603 3.439 3.536 4.494 
Income Increase Indicator 0.315 0.465 0.505 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.301 3.845 3.693 4.311 0.000 0.000 7.311 3.213 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 13.082 4.300 12.866 4.478 13.438 3.966 12.295 4.867 13.443 3.963 
Games Started 7.480 6.554 6.110 6.380 9.745 6.206 4.940 6.103 8.646 6.425 
Tackles 42.252 29.920 37.636 29.939 49.883 28.310 33.148 29.328 46.433 29.269 
Sacks 0.334 0.726 0.300 0.681 0.390 0.791 0.261 0.686 0.367 0.741 
Passes Defended 4.703 4.806 4.011 4.609 5.846 4.911 3.093 4.146 5.442 4.909 
Interceptions 1.456 1.791 1.208 1.615 1.866 1.985 0.973 1.390 1.679 1.908 
Forced Fumbles 0.534 0.891 0.477 0.859 0.628 0.935 0.423 0.772 0.586 0.937 
Pension Eligibility 0.352 0.478 0.125 0.331 0.729 0.445 0.090 0.287 0.473 0.500 
Second Team 0.227 0.419 0.112 0.316 0.418 0.494 0.108 0.310 0.282 0.450 
Third Team 0.076 0.264 0.037 0.188 0.140 0.347 0.043 0.202 0.091 0.287 
Fourth Team 0.025 0.157 0.014 0.117 0.044 0.205 0.018 0.131 0.029 0.167 
Fifth Team 0.009 0.093 0.006 0.079 0.013 0.111 0.005 0.071 0.010 0.101 
Sixth Team 0.003 0.056 0.003 0.050 0.004 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.068 
Seventh Team 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.034 
Win Percentage 0.506 0.192 0.508 0.193 0.502 0.190 0.514 0.185 0.502 0.195 
Playoff Appearance 0.370 0.483 0.370 0.483 0.370 0.483 0.383 0.487 0.364 0.481 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 92.474 200.796 55.355 137.888 153.848 263.824 0.806 2.084 134.572 230.688 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 27.491 94.685 20.104 79.651 39.705 114.373 0.485 1.288 39.893 112.237 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.376 13.330 2.751 13.778 1.755 12.543 2.458 13.301 2.338 13.350 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.489 0.974 22.543 0.965 22.399 0.982 22.663 1.042 22.409 0.930 
Height (in inches) 71.648 1.661 71.615 1.694 71.701 1.606 71.575 1.699 71.681 1.643 
Weight 200.351 11.354 200.057 11.418 200.837 11.244 200.093 11.871 200.470 11.114 
Number of Observations 1270 791 479 400 870 
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Table 2.2:  Defensive Linemen Summary Statistics (Firm Tenure) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.418 1.542 1.893 1.002 3.084 1.826 1.977 0.899 2.581 1.692 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.560 0.497 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.396 0.489 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 4.643 4.795 8.294 3.281 0.000 0.000 8.526 2.318 3.198 4.675 
Income Increase Indicator 0.271 0.445 0.484 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 1.935 3.514 3.457 4.099 0.000 0.000 7.137 2.896 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.933 4.547 12.293 4.977 13.747 3.785 11.460 5.339 13.481 4.085 
Games Started 7.854 6.668 6.028 6.490 10.176 6.155 4.304 5.833 9.174 6.477 
Tackles 28.368 19.032 24.267 18.001 33.583 19.051 20.183 16.907 31.413 18.890 
Sacks 2.719 2.969 2.153 2.645 3.438 3.198 1.768 2.275 3.072 3.117 
Passes Defended 1.385 1.715 1.203 1.667 1.616 1.749 1.030 1.627 1.516 1.729 
Interceptions 0.087 0.306 0.072 0.279 0.105 0.337 0.053 0.225 0.099 0.330 
Forced Fumbles 0.676 1.146 0.565 1.086 0.817 1.204 0.452 1.090 0.760 1.156 
Pension Eligibility 0.414 0.493 0.136 0.343 0.768 0.423 0.057 0.232 0.547 0.498 
Second Team 0.233 0.423 0.129 0.335 0.365 0.482 0.133 0.340 0.270 0.444 
Third Team 0.081 0.274 0.037 0.189 0.138 0.345 0.011 0.106 0.107 0.310 
Fourth Team 0.035 0.184 0.017 0.128 0.059 0.235 0.011 0.106 0.044 0.205 
Fifth Team 0.006 0.078 0.004 0.061 0.009 0.096 0.004 0.062 0.007 0.084 
Sixth Team 0.003 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.065 
Seventh Team 0.004 0.064 0.002 0.043 0.007 0.084 0.004 0.062 0.004 0.065 
Win Percentage 0.507 0.191 0.505 0.197 0.509 0.184 0.521 0.195 0.501 0.190 
Playoff Appearance 0.369 0.483 0.381 0.486 0.354 0.479 0.403 0.491 0.356 0.479 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 120.524 237.245 68.280 156.188 186.960 298.477 0.873 2.130 165.033 264.450 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 34.173 103.670 21.825 85.443 49.875 121.312 0.515 1.006 46.693 119.045 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.667 13.478 2.757 13.355 2.552 13.649 3.735 12.895 2.269 13.677 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.589 1.049 22.656 1.040 22.504 1.056 22.859 1.098 22.488 1.013 
Height (in inches) 75.563 1.491 75.606 1.490 75.508 1.492 75.616 1.511 75.543 1.484 
Weight 294.433 24.241 294.440 23.415 294.424 25.280 292.395 21.306 295.191 25.218 
Number of Observations 970 543 427 263 707 
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Table 2.3:  Linebackers Summary Statistics (Firm Tenure) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.311 1.525 1.887 1.062 3.003 1.874 2.018 1.002 2.452 1.704 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.620 0.486 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.437 0.496 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.222 4.844 8.422 3.298 0.000 0.000 8.516 3.067 3.636 4.745 
Income Increase Indicator 0.325 0.469 0.524 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.379 3.852 3.838 4.283 0.000 0.000 7.323 3.073 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 13.171 4.435 12.861 4.554 13.677 4.192 12.746 4.689 13.376 4.296 
Games Started 7.476 6.702 5.765 6.398 10.269 6.240 4.686 6.057 8.820 6.586 
Tackles 52.204 42.454 42.970 39.713 67.269 42.526 35.682 34.822 60.156 43.518 
Sacks 1.190 2.125 0.869 1.680 1.715 2.617 0.638 1.275 1.456 2.386 
Passes Defended 1.940 2.431 1.452 2.094 2.737 2.718 1.113 1.722 2.338 2.616 
Interceptions 0.478 0.933 0.378 0.849 0.640 1.036 0.272 0.630 0.577 1.034 
Forced Fumbles 0.651 1.003 0.519 0.929 0.867 1.082 0.382 0.707 0.781 1.096 
Pension Eligibility 0.378 0.485 0.150 0.357 0.749 0.434 0.117 0.322 0.503 0.500 
Second Team 0.233 0.423 0.126 0.332 0.408 0.492 0.117 0.322 0.289 0.454 
Third Team 0.078 0.268 0.043 0.202 0.136 0.343 0.053 0.224 0.090 0.287 
Fourth Team 0.025 0.157 0.013 0.113 0.045 0.208 0.018 0.132 0.029 0.168 
Fifth Team 0.007 0.083 0.004 0.061 0.012 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.101 
Win Percentage 0.501 0.187 0.509 0.188 0.488 0.186 0.493 0.186 0.505 0.188 
Playoff Appearance 0.372 0.484 0.394 0.489 0.335 0.473 0.360 0.481 0.378 0.485 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 88.563 201.185 45.108 107.954 159.457 282.032 0.759 2.122 130.823 233.412 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 22.123 72.678 15.677 68.081 32.639 78.588 0.433 0.713 32.562 86.559 
Millions Under Salary Cap 3.195 13.135 3.685 13.034 2.395 13.279 3.607 12.626 2.997 13.379 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.582 0.881 22.622 0.886 22.517 0.872 22.746 0.891 22.503 0.867 
Height (in inches) 73.794 1.402 73.698 1.369 73.952 1.443 73.774 1.388 73.804 1.410 
Weight 240.663 8.495 239.852 8.171 241.985 8.854 239.838 8.002 241.060 8.701 
Number of Observations 871 540 331 283 588 
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Table 2.4:  Running Backs Summary Statistics (Firm Tenure) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.287 1.599 1.883 1.243 2.977 1.881 1.848 1.002 2.549 1.817 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.631 0.483 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.411 0.493 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.454 4.882 8.646 3.187 0.000 0.000 8.838 3.014 3.438 4.664 
Income Increase Indicator 0.373 0.484 0.592 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.901 4.227 4.598 4.530 0.000 0.000 7.768 3.164 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 11.922 4.902 11.632 5.070 12.418 4.569 10.773 5.417 12.607 4.435 
Games Started 4.702 5.383 3.664 4.998 6.475 5.561 2.348 3.913 6.104 5.648 
Touches 96.740 111.100 81.296 103.343 123.130 118.868 52.250 79.024 123.253 118.799 
Yards 456.538 528.336 393.863 506.884 563.636 547.695 256.345 395.881 575.840 560.722 
Touchdowns 2.868 4.059 2.590 4.026 3.345 4.078 1.667 3.058 3.585 4.402 
Fumbles 1.202 1.590 1.034 1.474 1.490 1.736 0.761 1.233 1.465 1.716 
Fumbles Lost 0.738 1.128 0.653 1.074 0.881 1.205 0.473 0.937 0.894 1.201 
Pension Eligibility 0.383 0.487 0.157 0.364 0.770 0.422 0.136 0.344 0.530 0.500 
Second Team 0.239 0.427 0.132 0.339 0.421 0.495 0.144 0.352 0.296 0.457 
Third Team 0.065 0.247 0.034 0.180 0.119 0.324 0.038 0.191 0.081 0.274 
Fourth Team 0.027 0.162 0.018 0.133 0.042 0.201 0.019 0.137 0.032 0.175 
Fifth Team 0.008 0.092 0.011 0.105 0.004 0.062 0.015 0.122 0.005 0.067 
Sixth Team 0.007 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.106 
Seventh Team 0.001 0.038 0.002 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.062 0.000 0.000 
Win Percentage 0.491 0.192 0.489 0.193 0.493 0.191 0.492 0.183 0.490 0.197 
Playoff Appearance 0.349 0.477 0.345 0.476 0.356 0.480 0.348 0.477 0.350 0.477 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 70.485 165.010 48.409 144.359 108.208 189.746 0.578 1.676 112.145 197.057 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 26.754 94.062 17.219 85.760 43.045 104.948 0.492 1.492 42.404 116.075 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.479 13.565 2.705 14.175 2.092 12.471 2.473 14.275 2.482 13.140 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.542 1.067 22.608 1.090 22.429 1.019 22.769 1.111 22.406 1.017 
Height (in inches) 71.277 1.589 71.253 1.660 71.318 1.463 71.299 1.602 71.264 1.583 
Weight 225.289 17.157 224.610 16.967 226.448 17.450 225.136 17.013 225.379 17.261 
Number of Observations 707 446 261 264 443 
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Table 2.5:  Tight Ends Summary Statistics (Firm Tenure) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.497 1.709 1.986 1.249 3.283 2.004 1.929 0.894 2.768 1.927 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.606 0.489 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.418 0.494 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.057 4.818 8.348 3.283 0.000 0.000 8.853 2.943 3.247 4.474 
Income Increase Indicator 0.323 0.468 0.533 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.474 3.860 4.085 4.246 0.000 0.000 7.664 2.510 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.529 4.869 12.217 5.139 13.007 4.399 11.301 5.535 13.114 4.411 
Games Started 7.109 5.749 5.953 5.533 8.884 5.640 4.389 5.100 8.405 5.596 
Touches 22.017 21.247 18.594 19.873 27.275 22.267 13.947 17.693 25.865 21.749 
Yards 231.394 235.887 197.670 221.721 283.963 248.228 144.504 193.118 273.175 243.441 
Touchdowns 1.857 2.050 1.505 1.828 2.399 2.252 1.204 1.748 2.169 2.113 
Fumbles 0.320 0.620 0.311 0.636 0.333 0.596 0.239 0.539 0.359 0.653 
Fumbles Lost 0.203 0.462 0.203 0.458 0.203 0.470 0.142 0.350 0.232 0.505 
Pension Eligibility 0.351 0.478 0.146 0.354 0.667 0.473 0.071 0.258 0.485 0.501 
Second Team 0.186 0.389 0.104 0.306 0.312 0.465 0.080 0.272 0.236 0.426 
Third Team 0.037 0.189 0.024 0.152 0.058 0.235 0.027 0.161 0.042 0.201 
Fourth Team 0.017 0.130 0.014 0.118 0.022 0.146 0.009 0.094 0.021 0.144 
Fifth Team 0.006 0.075 0.005 0.069 0.007 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.092 
Win Percentage 0.520 0.190 0.514 0.192 0.528 0.186 0.516 0.184 0.522 0.193 
Playoff Appearance 0.409 0.492 0.401 0.491 0.420 0.495 0.434 0.498 0.397 0.490 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 73.931 153.720 54.683 140.648 103.501 168.151 0.724 1.899 108.836 176.502 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 18.995 77.691 9.194 36.643 34.052 113.715 0.465 1.246 27.830 93.179 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.438 12.900 3.044 13.202 1.508 12.410 2.313 12.712 2.498 13.014 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.766 1.025 22.745 0.934 22.797 1.154 22.920 1.045 22.692 1.010 
Height (in inches) 76.186 1.308 76.179 1.249 76.196 1.398 76.115 1.245 76.219 1.338 
Weight 255.169 9.526 254.840 9.631 255.674 9.376 254.283 10.293 255.591 9.131 
Number of Observations 350 212 138 113 237 
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Table 2.6:  Wide Receivers Summary Statistics (Firm Tenure) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.230 1.467 1.858 0.975 2.869 1.892 1.963 0.899 2.354 1.652 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.632 0.483 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.461 0.499 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.138 4.556 8.131 2.913 0.000 0.000 8.377 2.801 3.637 4.432 
Income Increase Indicator 0.317 0.466 0.501 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.319 3.848 3.669 4.299 0.000 0.000 7.322 3.178 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.173 4.932 11.457 5.282 13.402 3.983 10.944 5.399 12.742 4.595 
Games Started 6.048 6.023 4.172 5.203 9.271 5.978 3.269 4.636 7.337 6.159 
Touches 32.132 28.682 24.056 24.318 46.000 30.304 19.537 22.020 37.970 29.543 
Yards 331.985 292.478 270.231 268.167 457.015 300.270 225.533 242.122 387.319 301.234 
Touchdowns 2.441 3.013 1.768 2.447 3.598 3.509 1.389 2.108 2.929 3.239 
Fumbles 0.752 1.208 0.752 1.325 0.753 0.977 0.588 1.079 0.828 1.257 
Fumbles Lost 0.372 0.678 0.350 0.686 0.410 0.666 0.278 0.600 0.416 0.708 
Pension Eligibility 0.331 0.471 0.093 0.290 0.741 0.439 0.046 0.211 0.464 0.499 
Second Team 0.173 0.379 0.079 0.270 0.335 0.473 0.060 0.238 0.225 0.418 
Third Team 0.070 0.256 0.030 0.171 0.139 0.347 0.019 0.135 0.094 0.293 
Fourth Team 0.022 0.147 0.009 0.096 0.044 0.205 0.014 0.117 0.026 0.159 
Fifth Team 0.013 0.114 0.005 0.068 0.028 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.138 
Sixth Team 0.001 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.046 
Win Percentage 0.497 0.198 0.495 0.199 0.500 0.198 0.483 0.207 0.503 0.194 
Playoff Appearance 0.370 0.483 0.385 0.487 0.343 0.476 0.366 0.483 0.371 0.484 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 113.273 229.896 57.060 129.378 209.798 316.824 0.625 1.718 165.488 262.250 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 33.419 100.649 20.725 87.020 55.217 117.539 0.430 0.884 48.710 118.726 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.709 13.132 3.175 13.155 1.908 13.079 2.247 13.330 2.923 13.048 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.459 0.957 22.538 1.015 22.323 0.832 22.796 1.106 22.303 0.835 
Height (in inches) 72.922 2.215 72.963 2.239 72.853 2.176 73.005 2.281 72.884 2.185 
Weight 201.348 14.001 201.193 14.132 201.614 13.798 200.727 14.169 201.635 13.929 
Number of Observations 682 431 251 216 466 
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Table 2.7:  Defensive Backs Summary Statistics (Career Length) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.867 1.820 2.121 1.237 4.767 1.683 2.219 1.062 3.228 2.042 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.718 0.450 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.561 0.497 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.854 4.166 8.154 2.324 0.000 0.000 8.337 2.090 4.473 4.388 
Income Increase Indicator 0.357 0.479 0.498 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.556 3.769 3.561 4.026 0.000 0.000 7.153 2.616 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 13.073 4.252 12.916 4.400 13.474 3.828 12.436 4.745 13.428 3.911 
Games Started 7.115 6.493 6.140 6.395 9.596 6.077 5.184 6.231 8.189 6.391 
Tackles 42.188 29.563 39.115 30.096 50.007 26.659 34.871 29.948 46.257 28.571 
Sacks 0.307 0.680 0.298 0.679 0.330 0.682 0.284 0.719 0.320 0.657 
Passes Defended 4.878 4.957 4.277 4.710 6.407 5.243 3.383 4.328 5.709 5.091 
Interceptions 1.394 1.745 1.211 1.607 1.859 1.982 1.018 1.429 1.603 1.867 
Forced Fumbles 0.548 0.906 0.511 0.889 0.641 0.945 0.459 0.809 0.597 0.953 
Pension Eligibility 0.185 0.388 0.036 0.187 0.563 0.497 0.015 0.120 0.280 0.449 
Win Percentage 0.511 0.194 0.508 0.193 0.518 0.196 0.517 0.185 0.507 0.199 
Playoff Appearance 0.388 0.487 0.380 0.486 0.407 0.492 0.401 0.491 0.380 0.486 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 93.034 206.207 54.172 131.489 191.916 305.539 0.730 1.893 144.364 242.526 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 27.729 92.974 21.766 81.950 42.904 115.202 0.454 0.918 42.897 113.197 
Millions Under Salary Cap 3.077 13.178 3.067 13.722 3.102 11.705 2.749 12.898 3.260 13.338 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.574 0.980 22.560 0.970 22.607 1.006 22.687 1.058 22.511 0.929 
Height (in inches) 71.665 1.655 71.656 1.691 71.685 1.564 71.596 1.735 71.702 1.609 
Weight 200.356 11.174 200.090 11.257 201.033 10.952 200.097 11.768 200.501 10.837 
Number of Observations 957 687 270 342 615 
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Table 2.8:  Defensive Linemen Summary Statistics (Career Length) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 3.181 2.059 2.159 1.280 5.070 1.884 2.129 0.935 3.672 2.248 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.649 0.478 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.485 0.500 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.328 4.355 8.212 2.351 0.000 0.000 8.614 2.025 3.794 4.304 
Income Increase Indicator 0.318 0.466 0.490 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.307 3.697 3.555 4.078 0.000 0.000 7.249 2.663 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.875 4.591 12.207 5.011 14.109 3.367 11.155 5.466 13.678 3.871 
Games Started 7.424 6.670 5.867 6.467 10.301 6.067 4.228 5.832 8.915 6.516 
Tackles 29.066 19.512 24.510 18.153 37.484 19.165 19.914 16.979 33.338 19.159 
Sacks 2.660 3.027 2.138 2.691 3.625 3.362 1.774 2.342 3.074 3.217 
Passes Defended 1.432 1.782 1.247 1.735 1.773 1.820 1.052 1.656 1.610 1.812 
Interceptions 0.092 0.316 0.076 0.281 0.121 0.372 0.056 0.230 0.109 0.348 
Forced Fumbles 0.716 1.211 0.592 1.124 0.945 1.330 0.478 1.136 0.827 1.231 
Pension Eligibility 0.250 0.433 0.047 0.211 0.625 0.485 0.009 0.093 0.362 0.481 
Win Percentage 0.510 0.195 0.504 0.198 0.520 0.190 0.522 0.197 0.504 0.194 
Playoff Appearance 0.380 0.486 0.383 0.487 0.375 0.485 0.414 0.494 0.364 0.482 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 118.263 237.496 59.738 142.022 226.397 324.964 0.857 2.052 173.068 270.791 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 35.272 100.736 23.763 89.259 56.537 116.293 0.508 0.992 51.500 118.594 
Millions Under Salary Cap 3.230 13.195 2.995 13.252 3.663 13.103 3.865 12.816 2.933 13.370 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.647 1.046 22.683 1.028 22.582 1.078 22.897 1.056 22.531 1.022 
Height (in inches) 75.584 1.526 75.617 1.512 75.523 1.552 75.638 1.517 75.559 1.531 
Weight 295.368 24.872 294.700 23.831 296.602 26.693 291.970 21.806 296.954 26.050 
Number of Observations 729 473 256 232 497 
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Table 2.9:  Linebackers Summary Statistics (Career Length) 
Variable Full Sample Mandatory Raise 
R i d 
Mandatory Raise 
N  R i d 
Income Increase 
R i d 
Income Increase 
N  R i d 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 3.052 1.959 2.236 1.371 4.985 1.779 2.367 1.213 3.435 2.180 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.703 0.457 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.537 0.499 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.693 4.181 8.098 2.316 0.000 0.000 8.221 2.063 4.282 4.396 
Income Increase Indicator 0.358 0.480 0.510 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.550 3.737 3.627 3.996 0.000 0.000 7.118 2.539 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 13.176 4.397 12.915 4.497 13.794 4.094 12.817 4.610 13.377 4.265 
Games Started 7.396 6.702 6.068 6.487 10.538 6.145 5.071 6.239 8.693 6.607 
Tackles 52.851 41.448 45.947 39.887 69.191 40.576 39.254 35.555 60.440 42.587 
Sacks 1.213 2.144 0.950 1.774 1.834 2.740 0.698 1.359 1.500 2.431 
Passes Defended 1.958 2.394 1.561 2.154 2.899 2.661 1.238 1.799 2.360 2.584 
Interceptions 0.469 0.882 0.382 0.808 0.673 1.009 0.308 0.663 0.558 0.973 
Forced Fumbles 0.681 1.049 0.558 0.968 0.970 1.172 0.421 0.739 0.826 1.163 
Pension Eligibility 0.224 0.417 0.064 0.244 0.603 0.491 0.042 0.200 0.326 0.469 
Win Percentage 0.504 0.190 0.511 0.189 0.487 0.192 0.493 0.185 0.510 0.192 
Playoff Appearance 0.384 0.487 0.391 0.488 0.367 0.483 0.350 0.478 0.402 0.491 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 87.663 196.000 46.521 110.266 185.042 295.604 0.650 1.891 136.229 230.880 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 25.687 80.766 17.527 72.524 45.001 94.985 0.453 0.725 39.771 98.067 
Millions Under Salary Cap 3.526 13.253 3.690 13.139 3.138 13.546 3.265 12.883 3.673 13.468 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.603 0.877 22.616 0.887 22.573 0.855 22.754 0.893 22.519 0.857 
Height (in inches) 73.827 1.333 73.718 1.336 74.085 1.290 73.800 1.339 73.842 1.330 
Weight 240.124 8.259 239.692 8.058 241.146 8.654 239.296 7.845 240.586 8.456 
Number of Observations 670 471 199 240 430 
 
 
 
86 
Table 2.10:  Running Backs Summary Statistics (Career Length) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.962 2.023 2.182 1.517 4.993 1.748 2.147 1.250 3.534 2.256 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.722 0.448 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.528 0.500 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 6.105 4.247 8.450 2.262 0.000 0.000 8.681 2.011 4.295 4.466 
Income Increase Indicator 0.413 0.493 0.571 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 3.231 4.143 4.473 4.268 0.000 0.000 7.832 2.350 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.099 4.830 11.916 4.945 12.575 4.496 11.217 5.350 12.718 4.331 
Games Started 4.437 5.265 3.618 4.942 6.568 5.495 2.382 3.959 5.880 5.585 
Touches 95.943 108.412 84.179 102.679 126.562 117.008 55.023 79.261 124.680 116.705 
Yards 454.698 515.469 406.776 498.564 579.425 539.134 271.742 399.530 583.181 548.473 
Touchdowns 2.897 3.901 2.666 3.897 3.500 3.860 1.774 3.006 3.686 4.253 
Fumbles 1.162 1.557 1.042 1.470 1.473 1.731 0.765 1.192 1.440 1.717 
Fumbles Lost 0.716 1.079 0.651 1.040 0.884 1.160 0.465 0.863 0.890 1.176 
Pension Eligibility 0.219 0.414 0.066 0.248 0.616 0.488 0.028 0.164 0.353 0.479 
Win Percentage 0.488 0.194 0.488 0.196 0.488 0.191 0.493 0.187 0.484 0.199 
Playoff Appearance 0.342 0.475 0.337 0.473 0.356 0.481 0.346 0.477 0.340 0.474 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 75.874 180.139 51.783 151.228 138.576 228.548 0.515 1.543 128.796 220.226 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 28.140 101.095 18.764 91.245 52.541 120.051 0.334 0.546 47.666 128.426 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.487 13.689 2.661 14.064 2.035 12.695 2.124 13.881 2.742 13.569 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.567 1.105 22.618 1.118 22.432 1.063 22.825 1.149 22.385 1.037 
Height (in inches) 71.200 1.608 71.224 1.697 71.137 1.353 71.230 1.628 71.178 1.597 
Weight 225.483 16.389 225.040 16.827 226.637 15.187 225.465 16.803 225.495 16.120 
Number of Observations 526 380 146 217 309 
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Table 2.11:  Tight Ends Summary Statistics (Career Length) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 3.105 1.963 2.301 1.566 4.549 1.772 2.182 1.146 3.597 2.127 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.642 0.480 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.452 0.499 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.284 4.359 8.229 2.297 0.000 0.000 8.717 2.127 3.457 4.136 
Income Increase Indicator 0.347 0.477 0.541 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.619 3.832 4.079 4.114 0.000 0.000 7.540 2.252 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.653 4.838 12.257 5.199 13.363 4.041 11.283 5.711 13.382 4.138 
Games Started 7.084 5.739 5.951 5.532 9.118 5.564 4.525 5.138 8.446 5.587 
Touches 23.095 21.811 19.426 20.343 29.676 22.887 14.566 18.373 27.634 22.178 
Yards 244.138 242.737 208.443 228.100 309.460 255.971 151.323 201.939 294.076 248.578 
Touchdowns 1.947 2.107 1.563 1.885 2.637 2.307 1.222 1.805 2.333 2.158 
Fumbles 0.354 0.659 0.333 0.666 0.392 0.647 0.253 0.560 0.409 0.701 
Fumbles Lost 0.235 0.494 0.219 0.476 0.265 0.525 0.141 0.350 0.285 0.550 
Pension Eligibility 0.246 0.431 0.071 0.258 0.559 0.499 0.020 0.141 0.366 0.483 
Win Percentage 0.524 0.190 0.520 0.190 0.533 0.189 0.515 0.185 0.529 0.193 
Playoff Appearance 0.414 0.493 0.393 0.490 0.451 0.500 0.424 0.497 0.409 0.493 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 80.582 165.234 57.271 148.608 122.406 184.997 0.790 2.002 123.052 191.546 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 22.773 85.628 10.420 39.278 44.936 130.632 0.387 0.602 34.688 104.139 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.721 12.954 3.286 13.369 1.709 12.172 2.192 13.042 3.003 12.933 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.740 1.079 22.749 0.962 22.725 1.268 22.960 1.068 22.624 1.070 
Height (in inches) 76.161 1.298 76.148 1.260 76.186 1.370 76.111 1.285 76.188 1.308 
Weight 255.663 9.238 255.180 9.408 256.529 8.904 254.899 10.357 256.070 8.585 
Number of Observations 285 183 102 99 186 
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Table 2.12:  Wide Receivers Summary Statistics (Career Length) 
Variable Full Sample 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise 
Not Required 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase 
Not Required 
 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Seasons Played 2.931 1.942 2.145 1.313 4.831 1.903 2.165 1.088 3.349 2.166 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.707 0.455 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.548 0.498 
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s) 5.850 4.254 8.271 2.351 0.000 0.000 8.541 2.065 4.383 4.422 
Income Increase Indicator 0.353 0.478 0.499 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income Increase (in 10000s) 2.612 3.868 3.693 4.143 0.000 0.000 7.405 2.621 0.000 0.000 
Games Played 12.026 5.010 11.369 5.304 13.614 3.783 10.925 5.416 12.627 4.673 
Games Started 5.589 5.934 3.998 5.142 9.434 5.973 3.165 4.592 6.910 6.167 
Touches 30.594 29.036 23.267 24.318 48.295 31.823 18.945 21.522 36.943 30.617 
Yards 313.580 293.378 262.141 270.087 463.970 307.750 222.241 244.252 369.414 306.938 
Touchdowns 2.309 2.887 1.753 2.519 3.651 3.264 1.385 2.159 2.812 3.105 
Fumbles 0.780 1.249 0.751 1.341 0.849 0.995 0.585 1.090 0.886 1.317 
Fumbles Lost 0.369 0.670 0.344 0.672 0.428 0.663 0.275 0.584 0.420 0.708 
Pension Eligibility 0.212 0.409 0.047 0.213 0.608 0.490 0.020 0.140 0.316 0.466 
Win Percentage 0.491 0.196 0.497 0.196 0.478 0.197 0.486 0.205 0.494 0.192 
Playoff Appearance 0.360 0.480 0.374 0.484 0.325 0.470 0.360 0.481 0.360 0.481 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 106.307 221.734 52.306 109.262 236.755 339.863 0.696 1.892 163.861 258.098 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 32.154 100.186 21.989 90.005 56.710 118.043 0.439 0.909 49.438 121.130 
Millions Under Salary Cap 2.866 12.995 3.142 13.058 2.199 12.857 2.002 13.255 3.337 12.846 
Age at Beginning of Career 22.429 0.954 22.496 1.000 22.265 0.810 22.730 1.088 22.264 0.829 
Height (in inches) 72.974 2.272 72.990 2.256 72.934 2.318 72.990 2.321 72.965 2.249 
Weight 201.575 14.499 201.459 14.340 201.855 14.917 200.665 14.540 202.071 14.472 
Number of Observations 567 401 166 200 367 
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Table 2.13:  Percentage of Defensive Backs Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 500 73.2% 64.4% 52.4% 19.8% 
2 315 70.8% 64.8% 47.0% 7.0% 
3 209 67.9% 63.2% 34.4% 8.6% 
4 134 38.1% 30.6% 29.9% 9.0% 
5 56 7.1% 3.6% 3.6% 1.8% 
6 32 9.4% 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 
7 17 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 
8 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 3 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
Total 1270 62.4% 55.5% 41.6% 12.2% 
 
Table 2.14:  Percentage of Defensive Backs Requiring an Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
Season Number of Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 500 29.2% 23.0% 16.8% 5.2% 
2 315 43.2% 38.7% 21.3% 5.1% 
3 209 42.6% 36.8% 9.1% 5.7% 
4 134 18.7% 13.4% 9.0% 3.0% 
5 56 5.4% 3.6% 3.6% 1.8% 
6 32 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 17 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 3 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 1270 31.5% 26.4% 14.5% 4.6% 
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Table 2.15:  Percentage of Defensive Linemen Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 362 67.7% 59.9% 48.1% 17.7% 
2 233 68.2% 62.2% 45.9% 10.7% 
3 165 60.0% 55.2% 33.9% 9.7% 
4 102 33.3% 24.5% 23.5% 9.8% 
5 56 8.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 
6 32 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 18 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 
8 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 970 56.0% 49.5% 37.4% 12.1% 
 
Table 2.16:  Percentage of Defensive Linemen Requiring an Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 362 26.0% 18.2% 13.3% 4.4% 
2 233 40.3% 35.2% 21.9% 6.4% 
3 165 38.8% 32.7% 8.5% 6.7% 
4 102 8.8% 7.8% 7.8% 3.9% 
5 56 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 32 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 18 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 970 27.1% 21.6% 12.5% 4.7% 
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Table 2.17:  Percentage of Linebackers Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 347 72.3% 64.3% 51.9% 21.0% 
2 217 72.4% 68.7% 47.0% 9.2% 
3 143 64.3% 60.1% 35.7% 11.2% 
4 87 35.6% 29.9% 28.7% 6.9% 
5 36 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 23 21.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 10 20.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
8 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 871 62.0% 55.7% 41.2% 13.3% 
 
Table 2.18:  Percentage of Linebackers Requiring an Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 347 28.8% 23.1% 17.0% 6.3% 
2 217 47.9% 44.7% 25.8% 6.5% 
3 143 42.7% 38.5% 11.2% 6.3% 
4 87 16.1% 10.3% 6.9% 1.1% 
5 36 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 23 8.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 10 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
8 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 871 32.5% 27.8% 15.8% 5.3% 
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Table 2.19:  Percentage of Running Backs Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 308 74.4% 69.8% 59.7% 22.1% 
2 164 68.9% 64.6% 48.8% 6.7% 
3 102 65.7% 63.7% 36.3% 12.7% 
4 58 37.9% 32.8% 31.0% 15.5% 
5 34 11.8% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 
6 21 19.0% 4.8% 4.8% 0.0% 
7 14 35.7% 35.7% 28.6% 28.6% 
8 5 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 707 63.1% 58.3% 46.0% 15.0% 
 
Table 2.20:  Percentage of Running Backs Requiring an Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 308 40.3% 33.8% 27.6% 9.1% 
2 164 47.0% 45.1% 26.2% 3.7% 
3 102 47.1% 42.2% 15.7% 9.8% 
4 58 20.7% 15.5% 15.5% 10.3% 
5 34 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 21 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 0.0% 
7 14 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 
8 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 707 37.3% 32.8% 21.9% 7.2% 
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Table 2.21:  Percentage of Tight Ends Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 135 71.9% 65.2% 55.6% 20.0% 
2 78 74.4% 73.1% 55.1% 11.5% 
3 55 67.3% 65.5% 38.2% 7.3% 
4 36 36.1% 19.4% 16.7% 2.8% 
5 20 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 14 21.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 7 28.6% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% 
8 4 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 350 60.6% 54.3% 41.7% 12.0% 
 
Table 2.22:  Percentage of Tight Ends Requiring an Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
Season Number of Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 135 32.6% 27.4% 18.5% 7.4% 
2 78 48.7% 48.7% 33.3% 6.4% 
3 55 47.3% 41.8% 10.9% 7.3% 
4 36 13.9% 8.3% 8.3% 2.8% 
5 20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 14 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 350 32.3% 28.9% 17.1% 5.7% 
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Table 2.23:  Percentage of Wide Receivers Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Firm Tenure) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 286 70.3% 61.9% 51.0% 17.8% 
2 171 71.9% 65.5% 48.0% 8.2% 
3 108 72.2% 62.0% 42.6% 13.9% 
4 61 42.6% 37.7% 31.1% 11.5% 
5 28 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 16 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 682 63.2% 55.6% 43.0% 12.8% 
 
 
Table 2.24:  Percentage of Wide Receivers Requiring an Income Increase (Firm Tenure) 
Season Number of Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 286 28.3% 21.7% 17.1% 5.2% 
2 171 42.1% 38.0% 22.2% 4.7% 
3 108 49.1% 39.8% 17.6% 11.1% 
4 61 16.4% 11.5% 8.2% 3.3% 
5 28 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 16 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 682 31.7% 26.0% 16.3% 5.4% 
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Table 2.25:  Percentage of Defensive Backs Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 280 95.0% 91.4% 73.6% 23.9% 
2 212 94.8% 90.1% 63.7% 9.0% 
3 165 87.3% 82.4% 46.7% 10.3% 
4 123 41.5% 36.6% 36.6% 11.4% 
5 77 10.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 52 13.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 31 29.0% 25.8% 25.8% 25.8% 
8 14 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 957 71.8% 66.5% 49.2% 13.1% 
 
Table 2.26:  Percentage of Defensive Backs Requiring an Income Increase (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 280 32.9% 25.7% 20.0% 5.7% 
2 212 60.4% 55.2% 29.2% 7.5% 
3 165 54.5% 47.3% 13.3% 7.9% 
4 123 22.0% 16.3% 12.2% 3.3% 
5 77 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 52 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 31 6.5% 6.5% 3.2% 0.0% 
8 14 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 957 35.7% 30.2% 16.3% 5.1% 
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Table 2.27:  Percentage of Defensive Linemen Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 193 92.7% 89.6% 70.5% 22.8% 
2 149 94.6% 90.6% 65.1% 11.4% 
3 118 81.4% 77.1% 47.5% 10.2% 
4 87 40.2% 33.3% 32.2% 13.8% 
5 67 11.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 51 13.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 36 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 
8 19 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 729 64.9% 59.5% 44.3% 12.5% 
 
Table 2.28:  Percentage of Defensive Linemen Requiring an Income Increase (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 193 34.7% 24.9% 16.6% 5.7% 
2 149 57.0% 51.7% 33.6% 8.7% 
3 118 55.9% 49.2% 14.4% 10.2% 
4 87 13.8% 11.5% 11.5% 4.6% 
5 67 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 51 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 36 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 19 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 729 31.8% 26.5% 15.0% 5.5% 
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Table 2.29:  Percentage of Linebackers Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 182 95.6% 94.0% 76.4% 23.6% 
2 145 94.5% 92.4% 60.7% 7.6% 
3 111 85.6% 80.2% 45.0% 11.7% 
4 82 42.7% 36.6% 34.1% 11.0% 
5 58 17.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 47 21.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 27 37.0% 33.3% 29.6% 25.9% 
8 11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 670 70.3% 64.6% 46.7% 12.4% 
 
Table 2.30:  Percentage of Linebackers Requiring an Income Increase (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 182 30.8% 24.7% 17.6% 5.5% 
2 145 62.8% 59.3% 33.1% 6.9% 
3 111 58.6% 54.1% 17.1% 9.0% 
4 82 22.0% 14.6% 13.4% 2.4% 
5 58 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 47 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 27 18.5% 18.5% 18.5% 3.7% 
8 11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 670 35.8% 31.0% 17.2% 4.9% 
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Table 2.31:  Percentage of Running Backs Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 166 96.4% 96.4% 80.1% 25.9% 
2 110 96.4% 94.5% 69.1% 6.4% 
3 78 82.1% 80.8% 46.2% 14.1% 
4 57 43.9% 42.1% 40.4% 19.3% 
5 44 11.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 30 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 23 43.5% 43.5% 39.1% 39.1% 
8 13 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 5 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 526 72.2% 68.6% 52.7% 15.4% 
 
Table 2.32:  Percentage of Running Backs Requiring an Income Increase (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 166 45.2% 40.4% 31.9% 9.0% 
2 110 68.2% 68.2% 40.9% 6.4% 
3 78 57.7% 55.1% 20.5% 12.8% 
4 57 28.1% 22.8% 22.8% 14.0% 
5 44 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 30 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 23 17.4% 17.4% 17.4% 8.7% 
8 13 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 5 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 526 41.3% 38.4% 24.9% 8.0% 
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Table 2.33:  Percentage of Tight Ends Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 79 88.6% 88.6% 73.4% 22.8% 
2 55 90.9% 90.9% 67.3% 9.1% 
3 47 76.6% 74.5% 40.4% 8.5% 
4 34 41.2% 26.5% 23.5% 5.9% 
5 28 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 21 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 16 37.5% 31.3% 25.0% 25.0% 
8 4 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 285 64.2% 59.3% 44.2% 11.6% 
 
Table 2.34:  Percentage of Tight Ends Requiring an Income Increase (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 79 39.2% 32.9% 20.3% 7.6% 
2 55 60.0% 60.0% 40.0% 7.3% 
3 47 57.4% 51.1% 14.9% 8.5% 
4 34 17.6% 11.8% 11.8% 2.9% 
5 28 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 21 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 16 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 6.3% 
8 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 285 34.7% 31.2% 17.9% 5.6% 
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Table 2.35:  Percentage of Wide Receivers Requiring a Mandatory Raise (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Mandatory Raise 
Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$50,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$75,000 Required 
Mandatory Raise > 
$100,000 Required 
1 173 91.9% 89.6% 72.8% 24.3% 
2 121 94.2% 90.1% 63.6% 12.4% 
3 90 87.8% 80.0% 57.8% 15.6% 
4 63 47.6% 46.0% 39.7% 11.1% 
5 49 14.3% 2.0% 2.0% 0.0% 
6 37 13.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 18 27.8% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 
8 12 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 567 70.7% 65.1% 50.1% 14.3% 
 
Table 2.36:  Percentage of Wide Receivers Requiring an Income Increase (Career Length) 
Season 
Number of 
Players 
Income Increase 
Required 
Income Increase > 
$50,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$75,000 Required 
Income Increase > 
$100,000 Required 
1 173 36.4% 28.3% 22.5% 5.8% 
2 121 54.5% 51.2% 29.8% 7.4% 
3 90 61.1% 51.1% 23.3% 14.4% 
4 63 19.0% 15.9% 12.7% 3.2% 
5 49 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 37 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 18 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 
8 12 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 567 35.3% 29.8% 18.7% 6.3% 
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Table 2.37:  Weibull Regression Results for Defensive Backs (Firm Tenure) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator 0.280       
(0.287)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   0.021     
   (0.408)     
Income Increase Indicator     -0.362   
     (0.137)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.025 
       (0.340) 
Games Played 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.035 
(0.168) (0.155) (0.158) (0.165) 
Games Started -0.067** -0.064* -0.071** -0.071** 
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.033) (0.033) 
Tackles 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 
 (0.115) (0.142) (0.106) (0.106) 
Sacks 0.459** 0.458** 0.437** 0.443** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) 
Passes Defended 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Interceptions 0.235** 0.235** 0.241** 0.239** 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
Forced Fumbles -0.038 -0.032 -0.024 -0.032 
 (0.807) (0.836) (0.878) (0.837) 
Pension Eligibility 0.425 0.376 0.075 0.143 
(0.244) (0.291) (0.825) (0.673) 
Second Team -1.275*** -1.278*** -1.226*** -1.218*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Third Team -1.559*** -1.561*** -1.513*** -1.510*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fourth Team -2.113*** -2.121*** -2.065*** -2.057*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fifth Team -2.415*** -2.406*** -2.354*** -2.351*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sixth Team -1.962*** -1.947*** -1.921*** -1.906*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Seventh Team -2.706*** -2.653*** -2.657*** -2.648*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Win Percentage -0.583 -0.584 -0.559 -0.535 
(0.454) (0.451) (0.468) (0.487) 
Playoff Appearance 0.390 0.385 0.346 0.341 
(0.236) (0.239) (0.281) (0.290) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.090) (0.077) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (0.344) (0.333) (0.337) (0.373) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.262** -0.259** -0.243** -0.247** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) 
Height (in inches) 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 
(0.966) (0.992) (0.976) (0.977) 
Weight 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
(0.239) (0.242) (0.243) (0.231) 
Number of Observations 1270 1270 1270 1270 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.38:  Weibull Regression Results for Defensive Linemen (Firm Tenure) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -0.429 
   (0.193) 
   Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.020   
  (0.527)     
Income Increase Indicator     -0.651*   
     (0.053)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.104** 
       (0.015) 
Games Played 0.031 0.030 0.033 0.031 
 (0.331) (0.354) (0.307) (0.324) 
Games Started 0.024 0.026 0.022 0.021 
 (0.475) (0.430) (0.516) (0.522) 
Tackles 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Sacks 0.092 0.096 0.097 0.104 
 (0.263) (0.250) (0.248) (0.215) 
Passes Defended 0.088 0.085 0.095 0.087 
 (0.454) (0.474) (0.429) (0.467) 
Interceptions 0.241 0.239 0.246 0.239 
(0.695) (0.702) (0.697) (0.702) 
Forced Fumbles 0.208 0.210 0.191 0.182 
 (0.301) (0.302) (0.351) (0.367) 
Pension Eligibility -0.248 -0.111 -0.350 -0.340 
(0.572) (0.798) (0.435) (0.431) 
Second Team -1.125*** -1.133*** -1.120*** -1.185*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Third Team -1.729*** -1.728*** -1.766*** -1.800*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fourth Team -2.128*** -2.152*** -2.153*** -2.178*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fifth Team -2.761*** -2.786*** -2.791*** -2.755*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sixth Team -2.123*** -2.102*** -2.145*** -2.155*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Seventh Team -0.396 -0.447 -0.319 -0.533 
 (0.813) (0.788) (0.856) (0.744) 
Win Percentage 0.597 0.671 0.798 0.787 
(0.554) (0.510) (0.440) (0.442) 
Playoff Appearance 0.418 0.392 0.369 0.307 
(0.303) (0.338) (0.373) (0.453) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.037) (0.037) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Millions Under Salary Cap -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.468) (0.468) (0.548) (0.457) 
Age at Beginning of Career 0.051 0.053 0.058 0.076 
(0.672) (0.661) (0.641) (0.537) 
Height (in inches) 0.038 0.040 0.050 0.030 
(0.657) (0.644) (0.569) (0.732) 
Weight 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 
(0.068) (0.072) (0.093) (0.091) 
Number of Observations 970 970 970 970 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.39:  Weibull Regression Results for Linebackers (Firm Tenure) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -0.148       
(0.559)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.030     
 
  (0.147)     
Income Increase Indicator     -0.559**   
 
    (0.023)   
Income Increase Indicator       -0.070*** 
 
      (0.007) 
Games Played 0.027 0.027 0.035 0.030 
 
(0.230) (0.233) (0.129) (0.188) 
Games Started -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.108*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Tackles 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sacks 0.111 0.103 0.111 0.110 
 
(0.282) (0.311) (0.282) (0.283) 
Passes Defended -0.117 -0.115 -0.112 -0.111 
 
(0.120) (0.123) (0.139) (0.142) 
Interceptions 0.617*** 0.602*** 0.597*** 0.582*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Forced Fumbles 0.295* 0.301* 0.293* 0.317* 
 
(0.080) (0.073) (0.085) (0.063) 
Pension Eligibility 0.375 0.342 0.269 0.282 
 
(0.246) (0.267) (0.392) (0.358) 
Second Team -1.865*** -1.858*** -1.943*** -1.916*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Third Team -1.874*** -1.841*** -1.878*** -1.864*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fourth Team -2.281*** -2.260*** -2.296*** -2.261*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fifth Team -2.326*** -2.345*** -2.402*** -2.392*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Win Percentage 1.696* 1.709** 1.593* 1.643* 
 
(0.054) (0.050) (0.068) (0.060) 
Playoff Appearance -0.210 -0.232 -0.168 -0.215 
 
(0.530) (0.484) (0.617) (0.518) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.072) (0.070) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.176) (0.189) (0.235) (0.233) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 
 
(0.412) (0.433) (0.412) (0.325) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.317*** -0.316*** -0.304*** -0.313*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Height (in inches) 0.023 0.025 0.011 0.007 
 
(0.775) (0.763) (0.893) (0.933) 
Weight 0.022* 0.023* 0.023* 0.022* 
 
(0.096) (0.085) (0.091) (0.095) 
Number of Observations 871 871 871 871 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.40:  Weibull Regression Results for Running Backs (Firm Tenure) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -0.189       
(0.465)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.007     
  (0.760)     
Income Increase Indicator     -0.410*   
     (0.098) 
 Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.029 
       (0.282) 
Games Played 0.043** 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 
(0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Games Started 0.070* 0.072* 0.066 0.070* 
 (0.088) (0.082) (0.114) (0.091) 
Touches -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Yards 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Touchdowns 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.978) (0.995) (0.974) (0.965) 
Fumbles 0.011 0.018 0.004 0.020 
 (0.951) (0.924) (0.982) (0.916) 
Fumbles Lost -0.115 -0.124 -0.099 -0.122 
 (0.630) (0.605) (0.681) (0.614) 
Pension Eligibility 0.933*** 0.987*** 0.825** 0.898*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) 
Second Team -1.684*** -1.683*** -1.667*** -1.670*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Third Team -2.057*** -2.055*** -2.043*** -2.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fourth Team -2.039*** -2.043*** -2.026*** -2.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fifth Team -1.878*** -1.879*** -1.850*** -1.835*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sixth Team -0.874 -0.855 -0.851 -0.836 
 (0.461) (0.477) (0.481) (0.492) 
Seventh Team -2.459*** -2.487*** -2.430*** -2.483*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Win Percentage 0.695 0.679 0.752 0.686 
(0.436) (0.450) (0.407) (0.449) 
Playoff Appearance 0.280 0.282 0.277 0.288 
(0.454) (0.455) (0.464) (0.448) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002 
(0.085) (0.082) (0.134) (0.106) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.523) (0.495) (0.620) (0.551) 
Millions Under Salary Cap -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.423) (0.400) (0.417) (0.395) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.152 -0.148 -0.161 -0.153 
(0.159) (0.171) (0.138) (0.159) 
Height (in inches) -0.103 -0.110 -0.099 -0.101 
(0.218) (0.191) (0.235) (0.228) 
Weight 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 
(0.241) (0.222) (0.236) (0.249) 
Number of Observations 707 707 707 707 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.41:  Weibull Regression Results for Tight Ends (Firm Tenure) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -0.990*       
 
(0.067)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.061     
 
  (0.153)     
Income Increase Indicator     -1.094*   
 
    (0.051)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.093 
 
      (0.143) 
Games Played 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Games Started 0.117 0.120 0.101 0.112 
 
(0.120) (0.130) (0.207) (0.170) 
Touches -0.159** -0.166** -0.171** -0.174** 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Yards 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016** 
 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Touchdowns 0.203 0.202 0.228 0.235 
 
(0.362) (0.387) (0.344) (0.336) 
Fumbles 1.648 1.724 1.718 1.739 
 
(0.237) (0.235) (0.246) (0.247) 
Fumbles Lost -1.971 -2.031 -2.165 -2.099 
 
(0.192) (0.195) (0.177) (0.194) 
Pension Eligibility 0.605 0.889 0.506 0.758 
 
(0.406) (0.219) (0.525) (0.330) 
Second Team -2.369*** -2.439*** -2.425*** -2.461*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Third Team -2.500*** -2.483*** -2.616*** -2.584*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fourth Team -3.095*** -3.054*** -3.233*** -3.156*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fifth Team -2.652*** -2.753*** -2.825*** -2.791*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Win Percentage 1.433 1.557 1.409 1.537 
 
(0.387) (0.363) (0.429) (0.390) 
Playoff Appearance -0.629 -0.632 -0.653 -0.648 
 
(0.324) (0.338) (0.336) (0.343) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.008** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.911) (0.896) (0.972) (0.936) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 
(0.414) (0.373) (0.399) (0.382) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.109 -0.111 -0.102 -0.112 
 
(0.604) (0.608) (0.645) (0.618) 
Height (in inches) -0.044 -0.056 -0.027 -0.031 
 
(0.801) (0.757) (0.885) (0.868) 
Weight 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.011 
 
(0.728) (0.715) (0.809) (0.696) 
Number of Observations 350 350 350 350 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
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Table 2.42:  Weibull Regression Results for Wide Receivers (Firm Tenure) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -0.696**       
(0.024)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.065***     
 
  (0.008)     
Income Increase Indicator     -0.370   
 
    (0.188)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.051* 
 
      (0.067) 
Games Played 0.051** 0.047** 0.049** 0.047** 
 
(0.025) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) 
Games Started -0.091** -0.086** -0.087** -0.088** 
 
(0.022) (0.029) (0.036) (0.032) 
Touches -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 
 
(0.781) (0.882) (0.747) (0.795) 
Yards 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 
(0.089) (0.098) (0.079) (0.080) 
Touchdowns 0.203** 0.187** 0.197** 0.186** 
 
(0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.049) 
Fumbles 0.175 0.204 0.178 0.188 
 
(0.380) (0.311) (0.390) (0.363) 
Fumbles Lost -0.315 -0.351 -0.317 -0.338 
 
(0.280) (0.234) (0.291) (0.260) 
Pension Eligibility -0.038 0.065 0.187 0.225 
 
(0.919) (0.855) (0.626) (0.528) 
Second Team -1.764*** -1.812*** -1.802*** -1.832*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Third Team -1.940*** -1.926*** -1.955*** -1.945*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fourth Team -1.859*** -1.851*** -1.867*** -1.867*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fifth Team -1.754*** -1.779*** -1.782*** -1.793*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sixth Team -2.072*** -2.069*** -2.055*** -2.069*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Win Percentage 1.504** 1.467* 1.452* 1.411* 
 
(0.049) (0.057) (0.075) (0.081) 
Playoff Appearance 0.019 0.010 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.956) (0.977) (0.994) (0.990) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.494) (0.550) (0.662) (0.696) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.296*** -0.294*** -0.283*** -0.283*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) 
Height (in inches) -0.031 -0.023 -0.031 -0.024 
 
(0.642) (0.730) (0.648) (0.731) 
Weight 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.678) (0.715) (0.696) (0.714) 
Number of Observations 682 682 682 682 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.43:  Weibull Regression Results for Defensive Backs (Career Length) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -2.258*       
 
(0.088)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.293**     
 
  (0.030)     
Income Increase Indicator     -3.487***   
 
    (0.003)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.438*** 
 
      (0.003) 
Games Played 0.307** 0.283** 0.316** 0.291** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) 
Games Started -0.277 -0.289 -0.333 -0.321 
 
(0.263) (0.232) (0.209) (0.217) 
Tackles 0.124** 0.125** 0.140** 0.135** 
 
(0.044) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) 
Sacks 1.402 1.487 1.281 1.484 
 
(0.429) (0.393) (0.480) (0.415) 
Passes Defended 1.118** 1.105** 1.083** 1.098** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) 
Interceptions 0.574 0.548 0.676 0.693 
 
(0.496) (0.506) (0.441) (0.427) 
Forced Fumbles 0.076 0.057 0.149 0.080 
 
(0.947) (0.959) (0.901) (0.946) 
Pension Eligibility 0.233 -0.237 -0.121 -0.279 
 
(0.869) (0.871) (0.935) (0.851) 
Win Percentage 4.609 4.759 5.261 5.247 
 
(0.195) (0.173) (0.163) (0.159) 
Playoff Appearance -0.802 -0.902 -0.998 -0.843 
 
(0.548) (0.493) (0.473) (0.540) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.174) (0.168) (0.251) (0.225) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.318) (0.300) (0.431) (0.381) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.023 0.025 0.018 0.015 
 
(0.514) (0.470) (0.640) (0.688) 
Age at Beginning of Career -1.033** -1.010** -0.930* -0.876* 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.051) (0.061) 
Height (in inches) -0.222 -0.200 -0.262 -0.195 
 
(0.467) (0.504) (0.414) (0.535) 
Weight 0.072 0.071 0.081 0.083 
 
(0.158) (0.160) (0.129) (0.123) 
Number of Observations 957 957 957 957 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.44:  Weibull Regression Results for Defensive Linemen (Career Length) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -5.661**       
 
(0.046)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.668**     
 
  (0.023)     
Income Increase Indicator     -3.542**   
 
    (0.041)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.568** 
 
      (0.011) 
Games Played 0.291 0.314* 0.318* 0.299* 
 
(0.104) (0.072) (0.076) (0.078) 
Games Started -0.305 -0.184 -0.229 -0.182 
 
(0.302) (0.521) (0.447) (0.523) 
Tackles 0.433** 0.395** 0.400** 0.383** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) 
Sacks 2.655** 2.617** 2.797** 2.714** 
 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) 
Passes Defended 0.813 0.944 0.911 0.755 
 
(0.444) (0.368) (0.386) (0.446) 
Interceptions -6.281 -6.887* -6.492 -5.880 
 
(0.116) (0.082) (0.112) (0.142) 
Forced Fumbles -2.169 -2.418 -2.382 -2.348 
 
(0.169) (0.117) (0.138) (0.126) 
Pension Eligibility 0.332 -0.323 2.511 2.145 
 
(0.894) (0.903) (0.257) (0.302) 
Win Percentage 20.366*** 20.879*** 23.707*** 22.765*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Playoff Appearance -3.667* -4.041** -4.158** -4.492** 
 
(0.069) (0.042) (0.043) (0.024) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.359) (0.328) (0.532) (0.568) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.071* 0.069* 0.082* 0.077* 
 
(0.089) (0.093) (0.071) (0.069) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.051 0.043 0.045 0.040 
 
(0.192) (0.267) (0.252) (0.289) 
Age at Beginning of Career -1.524*** -1.553*** -1.512*** -1.471*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Height (in inches) 1.247** 1.261** 1.298** 1.164** 
 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.022) (0.026) 
Weight 0.205*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Players 193 193 193 193 
Number of Observations 729 729 729 729 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.45:  Weibull Regression Results for Linebackers (Career Length) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -1.896       
 
(0.157)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.199     
 
  (0.108)     
Income Increase Indicator     -2.835**   
 
    (0.033)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.319** 
 
      (0.047) 
Games Played 0.067 0.065 0.071 0.070 
 
(0.495) (0.505) (0.502) (0.503) 
Games Started -0.523* -0.511* -0.578* -0.562* 
 
(0.083) (0.082) (0.087) (0.091) 
Tackles 0.235*** 0.230*** 0.256** 0.246** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Sacks 0.973 1.008 1.013 1.141 
 
(0.336) (0.317) (0.347) (0.300) 
Passes Defended -0.338 -0.324 -0.338 -0.327 
 
(0.574) (0.586) (0.606) (0.613) 
Interceptions 0.954 0.978 0.812 0.783 
 
(0.527) (0.516) (0.612) (0.626) 
Forced Fumbles 1.078 1.061 1.235 1.170 
 
(0.335) (0.338) (0.307) (0.326) 
Pension Eligibility 1.526 1.645 1.097 1.256 
 
(0.322) (0.262) (0.500) (0.434) 
Win Percentage 8.150* 7.767* 8.310* 8.304* 
 
(0.056) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) 
Playoff Appearance -0.743 -0.752 -0.856 -0.946 
 
(0.617) (0.610) (0.589) (0.548) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.361) (0.446) (0.587) (0.512) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.948) (0.978) (0.994) (0.946) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.041 
 
(0.434) (0.416) (0.389) (0.295) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.746 -0.797 -0.734 -0.776 
 
(0.154) (0.129) (0.194) (0.170) 
Height (in inches) 0.899** 0.905** 0.877* 0.877* 
 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.055) (0.054) 
Weight 0.051 0.055 0.048 0.047 
 
(0.423) (0.390) (0.488) (0.490) 
Number of Observations 670 670 670 670 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.46:  Weibull Regression Results for Running Backs (Career Length) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -2.381**       
 
(0.024)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.274***     
 
  (0.005)     
Income Increase Indicator     -2.877***   
 
    (0.003)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.290*** 
 
      (0.007) 
Games Played 0.312*** 0.328*** 0.329*** 0.331*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Games Started 0.194 0.168 0.188 0.195 
 
(0.229) (0.300) (0.277) (0.268) 
Touches -0.079** -0.081** -0.082** -0.084** 
 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.047) (0.049) 
Yards 0.021** 0.022** 0.023** 0.023** 
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) 
Touchdowns -0.050 -0.053 -0.068 -0.082 
 
(0.852) (0.843) (0.812) (0.784) 
Fumbles -0.388 -0.376 -0.537 -0.383 
 
(0.573) (0.582) (0.464) (0.607) 
Fumbles Lost 0.669 0.695 0.869 0.726 
 
(0.465) (0.448) (0.378) (0.466) 
Pension Eligibility 3.103*** 2.582** 2.414** 2.604** 
 
(0.007) (0.024) (0.047) (0.038) 
Win Percentage 2.768 2.465 2.835 2.665 
 
(0.251) (0.315) (0.286) (0.331) 
Playoff Appearance -0.688 -0.652 -0.642 -0.574 
 
(0.498) (0.530) (0.563) (0.618) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.220) (0.197) (0.438) (0.352) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.834) (0.733) (0.595) (0.705) 
Millions Under Salary Cap -0.021 -0.020 -0.030 -0.031 
 
(0.375) (0.381) (0.215) (0.214) 
Age at Beginning of Career -0.815*** -0.832*** -0.728*** -0.775*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) 
Height (in inches) -0.360 -0.402 -0.422* -0.413 
 
(0.149) (0.101) (0.100) (0.118) 
Weight 0.065** 0.067** 0.071** 0.071** 
 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
Number of Observations 526 526 526 526 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.47:  Weibull Regression Results for Tight Ends (Career Length) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -18.598       
 
(0.997)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -2.796     
 
  (0.997)     
Income Increase Indicator     -55.657   
 
    (0.995)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -5.821 
 
      (0.997) 
Games Played 3.929 3.287 3.640 3.131 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Games Started 8.026 6.713 5.347 5.956 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Touches -6.492 -5.605 -5.874 -6.706 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Yards 0.584 0.500 0.608 0.628 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Touchdowns 19.517 15.497 14.730 16.507 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Fumbles -17.084 -14.968 -13.136 -15.655 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Fumbles Lost 555.187 469.768 432.289 427.197 
 
(0.998) (0.998) (0.997) (0.998) 
Pension Eligibility 36.182 26.383 -8.508 5.099 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Win Percentage 76.668 72.959 65.448 64.585 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Playoff Appearance -7.859 -7.730 -6.282 -8.605 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.173 0.142 0.085 0.088 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) -0.200 -0.124 -0.212 -0.180 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.058 0.137 -0.075 -0.054 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Age at Beginning of Career -15.400 -13.349 -14.961 -13.414 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Height (in inches) -1.389 -1.495 0.309 -0.339 
 
(0.997) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Weight 0.003 -0.015 0.019 0.201 
 
(0.998) (0.997) (0.995) (0.997) 
Number of Observations 285 285 285 285 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.48:  Weibull Regression Results for Wide Receivers (Career Length) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mandatory Raise Indicator -2.173       
 
(0.117)       
Mandatory Raise (in 10000s)   -0.209*     
 
  (0.068)     
Income Increase Indicator     -0.855   
 
    (0.327)   
Income Increase (in 10000s)       -0.093 
 
      (0.334) 
Games Played 0.195*** 0.190*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Games Started -0.364 -0.300 -0.364 -0.358 
 
(0.127) (0.194) (0.140) (0.145) 
Touches 0.106 0.107 0.121 0.123 
 
(0.422) (0.407) (0.379) (0.370) 
Yards 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.445) (0.533) (0.510) (0.521) 
Touchdowns 0.471 0.555 0.562 0.552 
 
(0.388) (0.312) (0.329) (0.336) 
Fumbles 0.736 0.770 0.773 0.771 
 
(0.412) (0.385) (0.406) (0.405) 
Fumbles Lost -0.953 -0.993 -1.084 -1.051 
 
(0.464) (0.437) (0.416) (0.428) 
Pension Eligibility 1.239 1.167 2.065 2.142* 
 
(0.329) (0.354) (0.109) (0.089) 
Win Percentage 4.047 3.172 3.734 3.732 
 
(0.135) (0.229) (0.196) (0.193) 
Playoff Appearance -1.342 -1.091 -1.317 -1.290 
 
(0.215) (0.311) (0.251) (0.260) 
Signing Bonus (in 10000s) 0.007* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
 
(0.074) (0.083) (0.098) (0.093) 
Other Bonuses (in 10000s) 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 
 
(0.432) (0.398) (0.342) (0.327) 
Millions Under Salary Cap 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.013 
 
(0.437) (0.560) (0.522) (0.584) 
Age at Beginning of Career -1.076*** -1.076*** -1.056*** -1.080*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Height (in inches) -0.000 0.057 0.029 0.035 
 
(0.999) (0.778) (0.893) (0.869) 
Weight 0.024 0.014 0.017 0.016 
 
(0.486) (0.692) (0.642) (0.661) 
Number of Observations 567 567 567 567 
Marginal Effects are reported.  P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 2.49:  Joint Test of Statistical Significance for Performance and Team 
Statistics (Firm Tenure Samples) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Defensive Backs 74.88*** 74.39*** 72.28*** 72.97*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Defensive Linemen 109.39*** 111.13*** 106.24*** 108.73*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Linebackers 104.53*** 104.55*** 101.89*** 103.06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Running Backs 78.15*** 79.01*** 74.92*** 76.4*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tight Ends 50.93*** 50.91*** 48.1*** 48.88*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wide Receivers 67.32*** 67.47*** 64.81*** 64.44*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
 
 
Table 2.50:  Joint Test of Statistical Significance for Performance and Team 
Statistics (Career Length Samples) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Defensive Backs 159.21*** 153.85*** 159.82*** 150.04*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Defensive Linemen 92.33*** 90.40*** 76.97*** 72.77*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Linebackers 90.92*** 99.03*** 89.27*** 88.02*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Running Backs 88.93*** 91.15*** 87.67*** 86.99*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tight Ends 70.02*** 73.03*** 70.48*** 69.69*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wide Receivers 101.62*** 101.99*** 100.69*** 101.83*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%.  
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3 Do Minimum Salaries Change the Experience Distribution through Changing 
the Relative Minimum Prices between Employees of Different Experience 
Levels? 
 
In general, firms choose the profit maximizing mix of labor inputs.  Firms have 
the option to choose between experienced and inexperienced labor.  In the presence of 
minimum salary schedules, the minimum salary for inexperienced labor is typically lower 
than the minimum salary for experienced labor.  In absolute terms, a firm can hire an 
inexperienced worker at a lower salary than they can hire an experienced worker.  When 
the minimum salary for inexperienced workers relative to the minimum salary for 
experienced workers changes, firms may be provided with the incentive to change their 
distribution of inexperienced and experienced workers. 
When the relative minimum salary between inexperienced and experienced labor 
changes, one of these two types of labor is more expensive in terms of the other type 
compared to the relative prices before the change.  The incentive to change the 
experience distribution exist when changing the relative minimum prices between 
inexperienced and experienced labor makes it more profitable for the firm to substitute 
away from the experience level that becomes relatively more expensive.  Studying the 
impact of changing relative prices on the experience distribution is important for two 
reasons.  The first reason is that changing the relative prices could be used as policy 
instrument to move the experience distribution closer to some desired experience 
distribution.  The second reason is that the level of profitability firms can achieve may be 
reduced when the relative minimum prices change.  This paper will focus on the first 
reason. 
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In general, in the situation that minimum salary schedules are put in place to 
protect older workers from receiving the lowest wages, it may be desirable to change the 
relative prices in a way that makes it more profitable for firms to hire experienced 
workers.  Evidence in Chapter 2 reveals that minimum salary schedules shorten career 
length when they force firm’s to increase a worker’s compensation.  Under minimum 
salary schedules, when the worker’s experience level increases, the minimum salary paid 
to the worker increases.  This increases the opportunity that a worker would be forced to 
receive an increase in compensation, therefore increasing the probability that a worker’s 
career length is shortened.  Even though minimum salary schedules can protect 
experienced workers by insuring that they do not receive the lowest salaries, they can 
harm experienced workers by shortening their careers.  In order to counteract the impact 
of shortened careers due to minimum salary schedules, relative prices could be changed 
in a way that makes it more profitable to hire experienced workers.  Furthermore, if the 
minimum salary schedule is put in place to protect older workers and the relative 
minimum prices are changing in a way that provide firms with an incentive to dismiss 
experienced workers in favor of inexperienced workers, relative prices can be changed to 
provide firms with the incentive to dismiss inexperienced workers in favor of experienced 
workers, aligning the relative price structure with the goal of minimum salary schedules.   
The National Football League (NFL) has a minimum salary schedule in place in 
which the minimum salary of a worker with x years of experience relative to the 
minimum salary of a worker with y years of experience has changed over time.  This is 
important because when the minimum salary of a player with x years of experience 
becomes more expensive relative to the minimum salary of a player with y years of 
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experience, the team has an incentive to hire more players with y years of experience and 
fewer players with x years of experience.  This is because a team can now hire more 
players at the minimum salary for y years of experience at the price it cost to hire a player 
at x years of experience.  In the absence of a change in the relative prices between the 
minimum salaries of players with different experience levels, the optimal number of 
players of each experience level is chosen.  When the relative prices between minimum 
salaries change, teams are likely to re-optimize, therefore changing the experience 
distribution of players. 
This chapter makes a contribution by using data from the NFL to focus on the 
impact of changing relative minimum salaries on an employer’s choice between 
inexperienced and experienced workers.  If the minimum salary of inexperienced workers 
increases relative to the minimum salary of experienced workers, employers have an 
incentive to hire fewer inexperienced workers on the margin because they are becoming 
relatively more expensive.  If the minimum salary of inexperienced workers decreases 
relative to the minimum salary of experienced workers, employers have an incentive to 
hire more inexperienced workers on the margin because they are becoming relatively 
more inexpensive.   
Table 3.1 shows the relative price for minimum salaries of all experience levels to 
the minimum salary of zero years of experience.  For example, in the year 2000, 1.425 
players with 0 years of experience can be employed at the minimum salary in place of a 
player with 1 year of experience at the minimum salary.  This translates to a team being 
able to employ almost 3 players at the minimum salary for 0 years of experience in place 
of 2 players at the minimum salary for 1 year of experience.  In 2002, the relative price of 
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the minimum salary of player with 1 year of experience to the minimum salary of a 
player with 0 years of experience falls to 1.333.  When this relative price changes from 
1.425 to 1.333, players with 1 year of experience are becoming cheaper relative to 
players with 0 years of experience.  In 2002, a team can employ roughly 4 players at the 
minimum salary for 0 years of experience in place of 3 players at the minimum salary for 
1 year of experience.  In 2008, players with 1 year of experience are becoming even 
cheaper relative to players with 0 years of experience.  In 2008, a team can employ 
roughly 5 players at the minimum salary for 0 years of experience in place of 4 players at 
the minimum salary for 1 year of experience.   
In any industry that employs a minimum salary schedule in which the relative 
price of the minimum salaries between workers of different experience levels changes, 
the firm has an incentive to substitute towards the experience level that becomes 
relatively cheaper.  In this paper, I measure the impact of changing relative prices on the 
experience distribution by exploiting the fact that the minimum salaries in the NFL have 
changed over time in a way that has changed the relative price of the minimum salaries 
between different experience levels. 
3.1 Theoretical Model  
 Previous studies of professional sports leagues have made the assumption that 
professional teams maximize profits (Hamlen Jr., 2007; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Scully, 
1974; Vrooman, 1995).  In this analysis, I also make the assumption that professional 
teams maximize profits.  Let each team choose the profit maximizing labor input mix by 
choosing the distribution of player salaries’ that maximize profits subject to the fact that 
the sum of all player salaries is less than or equal to the league salary cap.  Therefore, a 
 
 118  
team’s profit maximization problem is to choose x1, x2, …, xn to maximize profits, (1), 
subject to the salary cap constraint, (2). 
(1)  profits = f(x1, x2, …, xn)   
(2)  a1x1 + a2x2 + … + an xn ≤ cap    
Each xi represent the number of players earning salary ai and cap is the NFL’s salary cap.  
The team’s constrained profit maximization problem becomes (3). 
(3)  max  L = f(x1, x2, …, xn)  - λ[a1x1 + a2x2 + … + an xn – cap]. 
The first order conditions of L with respect to xi and xj are shown in (4) and (5). 
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Dividing (4) by (5) yields (6). 
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Equation (6) tells us that at a maximum, the ratio of the marginal productivity of a player 
earning salary ai to the marginal productivity of a player earning salary aj is equal to the 
ratio of the salary ai to the salary aj.   
For example, let xi represent the number of players on the team earning the 
minimum salary for one year of experience.  Let xj represent the number of players on the 
team earning the minimum salary for zero years of experience.  Let ai represent the 
minimum salary for players with one year of experience.  Let aj represent the minimum 
salary for players with zero years of experience.  The NFL’s minimum salary structure 
currently causes the relative price of a player with one year of experience to a player with 
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zero years of experience to change over time.  Profit maximization requires that an 
increase in the relative price of a player with one year of experience to a player with zero 
years of experience lead to an increase in the ratio of the marginal product of a player 
with one year of experience to the marginal product of a player with zero years of 
experience.  When the relative price of a player with one year of experience to a player 
with zero years of experience increase, players with zero years of experience become less 
expensive relative to players with one year of experience.  This provides the team with an 
incentive to increase the number of players on the team with zero years of experience and 
decrease the number of players on the team with one year of experience.  Increasing the 
number of players on the team earning the minimum salary with zero years of experience 
will reduce the marginal product of players with zero years of experience.  Decreasing 
the number of players on the team earning the minimum salary with one year of 
experience will enlarge the marginal product of players with one year of experience.  
Both of these actions increase the ratio of the marginal product of players with one year 
of experience to the marginal product of players with zero years of experience.  These 
actions will be taken until the ratio of the marginal product of players earning the 
minimum salary for one year of experience to the marginal product of players earning the 
minimum salary for zero years of experience is equated to the ratio of minimum salaries.  
When a team increases the number of players earning the minimum salary for zero years 
of experience and decreases the number of players earning the minimum salary for one 
year of experience, the experience distribution changes. 
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3.2 Empirical Model 
 In order to test whether the NFL’s salary structure has an impact on a firm’s labor 
input mix, I estimate Ordinary Least Squares Models represented by equation (7).   
(7)  percent_x_years_experience = β0 +β1relative_min_price_1to2_0 +    
       β2relative_min_price_3to6_0 + β3relative_min_price_7ormore_0 +   
       β4under_the_salary_cap_in_ten_millions + δteam + ε 
         
The dependent variable, percent_x_years_experience, represents the percentage of 
players at 1 of 4 groups of experience levels, 0 years of experience, 1 to 2 years of 
experience, 3 to 6 years of experience, and 7 or more years of experience.  I estimate four 
different models where I allow the dependent variable to represent one of the four groups 
of experience levels in each model.  The explanatory variables of interest are 
relative_min_price_1to2_0, relative_min_price_3to6_0, and 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0.  These variables represent the relative prices for the 
minimum salary of a player with 1 to 2 years of experience to the minimum salary of a 
player with 0 years of experience, the relative price of the minimum salary of a player 
with 3 to 6 years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of 
experience, and the relative price of the minimum salary of a player with 7 or more years 
of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience.  These 
variables are simply the ratios of the minimum salary for a player in each of the three 
experience level groups to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience.  I 
also restrict the sample to players who earn less than $200 thousand dollars above the 
minimum salary estimate four different models where I allow the dependent variable to 
represent one of the four groups of experience levels in each model.  I restrict the sample 
to estimate the impact of changing relative prices for players who are close to earning the 
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minimum salary.  Table 3.2 provides descriptions of the variables used in the models.  I 
choose to use the relative prices for the minimum salaries of all other experience levels to 
minimum salary for 0 years of experience because the minimum salary for a player with 
zero years of experience is the lowest salary a team can pay a player and only players 
with zero years of experience can earn that salary. 
 Equations (1) – (6) show that when a team maximizes profits the ratio of the 
salaries to the ratio of marginal products are equated.  When the ratios of the salaries 
change, the ratio of marginal products must change to equate these ratios.  The ratio of 
salaries changes when the relative price for the minimum salaries of two experience 
levels changes.  In order to equate the ratio of salaries to the ratio of marginal products 
the quantity of players at a given salary must adjust.  The empirical model is a test of the 
theoretical model because when the relative price for the minimum salaries of two 
experience levels changes, the quantity of players at those experience levels should 
change in order for the ratio of marginal products to adjust.   
 The experience level group with 1 to 2 years of experience can be thought of as 
low experienced players.  The experience level group with 3 to 6 years of experience can 
be thought of as medium experienced players.  The experience level group with 7 or more 
years of experience can be thought of as high experienced players.  The experience levels 
are grouped the way they are because the relative price of the minimum salaries of the 
experience levels in a particular group to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of 
experience are almost perfectly correlated.   
Table 3.3 shows the correlation coefficients between the relative prices for the 
minimum salary of all experience levels in terms of the minimum salary of 0 years of 
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experience.  The correlation coefficient between the relative price for the minimum salary 
of a player with 1 year of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of 
experience and the relative price for the minimum salary of a player with 2 years of 
experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience is 0.9999.  This 
correlation coefficient indicates that these two variables almost always move together.  
Given the strength of the linear relationship between these two variables, I only use the 
relative price for the minimum salary of a player with 1 year of experience to the 
minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience to estimate the impact of both of 
these relative prices.  The correlation coefficient between the relative price for the 
minimum salary of a player with 3 years of experience to the minimum salary of a player 
with 0 years of experience and the relative price for the minimum salary of a player with 
5 to 6 years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience is 
0.9782.  I only use the relative price for the minimum salary of a player with 5 to 6 years 
of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience to estimate 
the impact these relative prices.  I also use the relative price for the minimum salary of a 
player with 5 to 6 years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of 
experience to measure the impact of the relative price for the minimum salary of a player 
with 4 years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience 
because these two variables are exactly the same for the last eight of the ten years in the 
sample.  The correlation coefficient between the relative price for the minimum salary of 
a player with 7 to 9 years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of 
experience and the relative price for the minimum salary of a player with 10 or more 
years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience is 
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0.9754.  I only use the relative price for the minimum salary of a player with 10 or more 
years of experience to the minimum salary of a player with 0 years of experience to 
estimate the impact these relative prices.       
In the model where percent_0_years_experience is the dependent variable, the 
expected sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_1to2_0 is positive.  When 
relative_min_price_1to2_0 increases, the minimum price of a player with 1 to 2 years of 
experience is increasing in terms of the minimum price of a player with 0 years of 
experience.  Players with 0 years of experience are expected to be substitutes for players 
with 1 to 2 years of experience, therefore the expected sign of the coefficient on 
relative_min_price_1to2_0 is positive.  The expected signs on the coefficients on 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are ambiguous.  The sign 
of these coefficients depend on whether players with 3 to 6 years of experience and 
players with 7 or more years of experience are complements to or substitutes for players 
with 0 years of experience.   If players with 3 to 6 years of experience and players with 7 
or more years of experience are complements to players with 0 years of experience, the 
expected signs of the coefficients on relative_min_price_3to6_0 and 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are negative.  This is because when 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 increase the price of a 
complement to players with zero years of experience increases, decreasing the amount of 
players with zero years of experience.  If players with 3 to 6 years of experience and 
players with 7 or more years of experience are substitutes for players with 0 years of 
experience, the expected signs of the coefficients on relative_min_price_3to6_0 and 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are positive.  This is because when 
 
 124  
relative_min_price_3to6_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 increases the price of a 
substitute for players with zero years of experience increases, increasing the amount of 
players with zero years of experience.   
In the model where percent_1to2_years_experience is the dependent variable the 
expected sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_1to2_0 is negative.  An increase 
in this variable indicates that at the minimum salaries players with 1 to 2 years of 
experience are becoming more expensive in terms of players with 0 years of experience.  
The expected signs on the coefficients on relative_min_price_3to6_0 and 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are ambiguous.  The sign of these coefficients depend on 
whether players with 3 to 6 years of experience and players with 7 or more years of 
experience are complements to or substitutes for players with 1 to 2 years of experience.   
If players with 3 to 6 years of experience and players with 7 or more years of experience 
are complements to players with 1 to 2 years of experience, the expected signs of the 
coefficients on relative_min_price_3to6_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are 
negative.  If players with 3 to 6 years of experience and players with 7 or more years of 
experience are substitutes for players with 1 to 2 years of experience, the expected signs 
of the coefficients on relative_min_price_3to6_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are 
positive.   
In the model where percent_3to6_years_experience is the dependent variable the 
expected sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_3to6_0 is negative.  An increase 
in this variable indicates that at the minimum salaries players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience are becoming more expensive in terms of players with 0 years of experience.  
The expected signs of the coefficients on relative_min_price_3to6_0 and 
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relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are ambiguous.  The sign of these coefficients depend on 
whether players with 1 to 2 years of experience and players with 7 or more years of 
experience are complements to or substitutes for players with 3 to 6 years of experience.   
If players with 1 to 2 years of experience and players with 7 or more years of experience 
are complements to players with 3 to 6 years of experience, the expected signs of the 
coefficients on relative_min_price_1to2_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are 
negative.  If players with 1 to 2 years of experience and players with 7 or more years of 
experience are substitutes for players with 3 to 6 years of experience, the expected signs 
of the coefficients on relative_min_price_1to2_0 and relative_min_price_7ormore_0 are 
positive. 
In the model where percent_7ormore_years_experience is the dependent variable 
the expected sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_7ormore_0 is negative.  An 
increase in this variable indicates that at the minimum salaries players with 7 or more 
years of experience are becoming more expensive in terms of players with 0 years of 
experience.  The expected signs of the coefficients on relative_min_price_1to2_0 and 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 are ambiguous.  The sign of these coefficients depend on 
whether players with 1 to 2 years of experience and players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience are complements to or substitutes for players with 7 or more years of 
experience.   If players with 1 to 2 years of experience and players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience are complements to players with 7 or more years of experience, the expected 
signs of the coefficients on relative_min_price_1to2_0 and relative_min_price_3to6_0 
are negative.  If players with 1 to 2 years of experience and players with 3 to 6 or more 
years of experience are substitutes for players with 7 or more years of experience, the 
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expected signs of the coefficients on relative_min_price_1to2_0 and 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 are positive. 
I control for the amount the team is under the salary cap, 
under_the_salary_cap_in_ten_millions, in order to account for the team’s ability to 
substitute a player with a higher minimum salary for a player with a lower minimum.  
The expected sign of the coefficient is ambiguous because a team can have any 
experience distribution and still be well below or well above the salary cap.  I also control 
for team effects by including team specific dummy variables, team.  An observation in 
this model is determined by the team and year.  Table 3.4 displays the summary statistics 
for the variables used in the model.       
3.3 Data 
This analysis uses NFL data from 2000 to 2009 to measure the impact of minimum 
salaries on the experience distribution through changing relative prices.  The salary and 
team roster data are collected from the USA Today’s NFL salary database located on the 
USA Today’s website (http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/football/nfl/salaries/team).   
The player experience data are collected from the NFL’s official website 
(http://www.nfl.com/players).  The relative price data are calculated using the minimum 
salary schedule in the NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement.   
In order to measure the impact of changing relative minimum prices on the 
experience distribution, I merge the team roster and salary data from the USA Today’s 
website with the experience data from the NFL’s website.  The combined data provide 
me with the salary and experience information for the players on each of the 32 NFL 
teams.  I observe all of these teams’ player experience and player salary information for 
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ten years except for the Houston Texans.  I only observe the player experience and player 
salary information for the Houston Texans for eight years because they were not an NFL 
franchise until 2002.   
The USA Today’s NFL salary database has salary information for some players 
who earn less the minimum salary.  During the NFL’s preseason, teams are allowed to 
employ more than the 53 player allowed on the roster during the regular season.  In order 
to measure the impact of changing relative prices on the experience distribution in the 
regular season, I only include the players from the USA Today’s website who earn more 
than the minimum salary for their experience level in the analysis.  Even though a team is 
allowed only 53 players on its active roster at any given time during the regular season, 
over the course of a regular season a team could employ more than 53 players.  Instead of 
using the number of players on a team in an experience level group, I use the percent of 
players on a team in an experience level group to account for the fact that all teams do not 
always employ the same number of players during the course of the regular season.    
Figure 3.1 shows the average percent of players with 0 years of experience, the 
average percent of players with 1 to 2 years of experience, the average percent of players 
with 3 to 6 years of experience, and the average percent of players with 7 or more years 
of experience from 2000 to 2009.  Figure 3.2 shows the average percent of players in 
each experience level group from 2000 to 2009 when the sample is restricted to players 
who earn less than $200 thousand above the minimum salary.  These figures provide 
evidence that the distribution of experience has changed over the ten years in the sample.  
Figure 3.3 shows the relative minimum price patios of 1 to 2, 3 to 6, and 7 or more years 
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of experience to 0 years of experience.  This figure provides a visual depiction of the 
relative minimum price ratios used in the models.    
3.4 Results 
Table 3.5 provides the regression results for the impact of changing relative prices 
on the 4 experience level groups.  Model (1) indicates that players with 1 to 2 years of 
experience are substitutes for players with 0 years of experience as expected because the 
sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_1to2_0 is positive and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient of 4.458 indicates that a one standard deviation (0.062) 
increase in relative_min_price_1to2_0 leads to a 27.6% increase in the percent of players 
with 0 years of experience.  The sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_3to6_0 is 
negative and statistically significant indicating that players with 0 years of experience are 
complements to players with 3 to 6 years of experience.  The sign of the coefficient on 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 is positive and statistically significant indicating that 
players with 0 years of experience are substitutes for players with 7 or more years of 
experience.  Model (2) indicates that a change in the relative prices do not have a 
statistically significant impact on the percent of players with 1 to 2 years of experience.  
Contrary to the expected result, Model (3) indicates that the percent of players with 3 to 6 
years of experience increases when relative_min_price_3to6_0 because the sign of the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient of 1.490 indicates that 
a one standard deviation (0.131) increase in relative_min_price_3to6_0 leads to a 19.5% 
increase in the percent of players with 3 to 6 years of experience.  The sign of the 
coefficient on relative_min_price_1to2_0 is negative and statistically significant 
indicating that players with 3 to 6 years of experience are complements to players with 1 
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to 2 years of experience.  The sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_7ormore_0 is 
negative and statistically significant indicating that players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience are complements to players with 7 or more years of experience.  As expected, 
Model (4) indicates that the percent of players with 7 or more years decrease as 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 increases.  The coefficient of -0.392 indicates that a one 
standard deviation (0.391) increase in relative_min_price_7ormore_0 leads to a 15.3% 
decrease in the percent of players with 7 or more years of experience.  The sign of the 
coefficient on relative_min_price_1to2_0 is negative and statistically significant 
indicating that players with 7 or more years of experience are complements to players 
with 1 to 2 years of experience.  The sign of the coefficient on 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 is positive and statistically significant indicating that players 
with 7 or more years of experience are substitutes for players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience.   
The variable under_the_salary_cap_in_ten_millions is positive and statistically 
significant in Model (1), it is not statistically significant in Model (2), and it is negative 
and statistically significant in Models (3) and (4).  Model (1) indicates that a $10 million 
increase in a team’s amount under the salary cap leads to a 1.0% increase in the percent 
of players with 0 years of experience.  Model (3) indicates that a $10 million increase in a 
team’s amount under the salary cap leads to a 0.8% increase in the percent of players 
with 3 to 6 years of experience.  Model (4) indicates that a $10 million increase in a 
team’s amount under the salary cap leads to a 0.5% increase in the percent of players 
with 7 or more years of experience.  Even though these results indicate that teams employ 
more players with no experience and fewer players with medium and high levels of 
 
 130  
experience, the magnitude of the impact of a $10 million dollar change in this variable is 
fairly small. 
I do not report the coefficients of the 31 team dummy variables in Models (1) 
through (4).  The omitted team dummy variable from the analysis is the Green Bay 
Packers.  In Model (1) there are 3 teams that have a statistically significant lower 
percentage of players with 0 years of experience compared to the Green Bay Packers.  
There are no teams in Model (1) with a statistically significant higher percentage of 
players with 0 years of experience compared to the Green Bay Packers.  In Model (2) 
there are 12 teams that have a statistically significant lower percentage of players with 1 
to 2 years of experience compared to the Green Bay Packers.  There are no teams in 
Model (2) with a statistically significant higher percentage of players with 1 to 2 years of 
experience compared to the Green Bay Packers.  In Model (3) there are no teams that 
have a statistically significant lower percentage of players with 3 to 6 years of experience 
compared to the Green Bay Packers.  There are 9 teams in Model (3) with a statistically 
significant higher percentage of players with 3 to 6 years of experience compared to the 
Green Bay Packers.  In Model (4) there is only one team that has a statistically significant 
lower percentage of players with 7 or more years of experience compared to the Green 
Bay Packers.  There are 13 teams in Model (4) with a statistically significant higher 
percentage of players with 7 or more years of experience compared to the Green Bay 
Packers. 
Table 3.6 provides the regression results for the impact of changing relative prices 
on the 4 experience level groups with the models restricted to only the players who earn 
less than $200 thousand above the minimum salary.  The amount of these players’ 
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salaries is close to the minimum salaries.  Model (5) indicates that players who are close 
to earning the minimum salary with 1 to 2 years of experience are substitutes for players 
who are close to earning the minimum salary with 0 years of experience.  As expected, 
the sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_1to2_0 is positive and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient of 2.704 indicates that a one standard deviation (0.062) 
increase in relative_min_price_1to2_0 leads to a 16.8% increase in the percent of players 
with 0 years of experience who are close to earning the minimum salary.  The sign of the 
coefficient on relative_min_price_3to6_0 is negative and statistically significant 
indicating that players with 0 years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary 
are complements to players with 3 to 6 years of experience who earn close to the 
minimum salary.  The sign of the coefficient on relative_min_price_7ormore_0 is 
positive and statistically significant indicating that players with 0 years of experience 
who earn close to the minimum salary are substitutes for players with 7 or more years of 
experience who earn close to the minimum salary.  As expected, Model (6) indicates that 
the percent of players with 1 to 2 years of experience who earn close to the minimum 
salary decrease as relative_min_price_1to2_0 increases.  The coefficient of -2.447 
indicates that a one standard deviation (0.062) increase in relative_min_price_1to2_0 
leads to a 15.2% decrease in the percent of players with 1 to 2 years of experience who 
earn close to the minimum salary.  The sign of the coefficient on 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 is positive and statistically significant indicating that players 
with 1 to 2 years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary are substitutes for 
players with 3 to 6 years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary. The sign 
of the coefficient on relative_min_price_7ormore_0 is negative and statistically 
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significant indicating that players with 1 to 2 years of experience who earn close to the 
minimum salary are complements to players with 7 or more years of experience who earn 
close to the minimum salary.  Model (7) indicates that a change in the relative prices do 
not have a statistically significant impact on the percent of players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience who earn close to the minimum salary.  Model (8) indicates that a change in 
the relative prices do not have a statistically significant impact on the percent of players 
with 7 or more years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary. 
The variable under_the_salary_cap_in_ten_millions is positive and statistically 
significant in Model (5), it is not statistically significant in Model (6), and it is negative 
and statistically significant in Models (7) and (8).  Model (5) indicates that a $10 million 
increase in a team’s amount under the salary cap leads to a 1.2% increase in the percent 
of players with 0 years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary.  Model (7) 
indicates that a $10 million increase in a team’s amount under the salary cap leads to a 
0.9% increase in the percent of players with 3 to 6 years of experience who earn close to 
the minimum salary.  Model (8) indicates that a $10 million increase in a team’s amount 
under the salary cap leads to a 0.4% increase in the percent of players with 7 or more 
years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary.  Even though these results 
indicate that teams employ more players with no experience and fewer players with 
medium and high experience who earn close to the minimum salary, the magnitude of the 
impact of a $10 million dollar change in this variable is fairly small. 
I do not report the coefficients of the 31 team dummy variables in Models (5) 
through (8).  The omitted team dummy variable from the analysis with the sample 
restricted to players who earn less than $200 thousand is also the Green Bay Packers.  In 
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Model (5) there are 3 teams that have a statistically significant lower percentage of 
players with 0 years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary compared to the 
Green Bay Packers.  There are no teams in Model (5) with a statistically significant 
higher percentage of players with 0 years of experience who earn close to the minimum 
salary compared to the Green Bay Packers.  In Model (6) there are 10 teams that have a 
statistically significant lower percentage of players with 1 to 2 years of experience who 
earn close to the minimum salary compared to the Green Bay Packers.  There are no 
teams in Model (6) with a statistically significant higher percentage of players with 1 to 2 
years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary compared to the Green Bay 
Packers.  In Model (7) there is one team that has a statistically significant lower 
percentage of players with 3 to 6 years of experience who earn close to the minimum 
salary compared to the Green Bay Packers.  There are 9 teams in Model (7) with a 
statistically significant higher percentage of players with 3 to 6 years of experience who 
earn close to the minimum salary compared to the Green Bay Packers.  In Model (8) 
there is only one team that has a statistically significant lower percentage of players with 
7 or more years of experience who earn close to the minimum salary compared to the 
Green Bay Packers.  There are 14 teams in Model (8) with a statistically significant 
higher percentage of players with 7 or more years of experience who earn close to the 
minimum salary compared to the Green Bay Packers. 
Models (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6) provide evidence that changing the relative price 
for the minimum salary of one experience level to the minimum salary of another 
experience level changes the experience distribution.  The fact that changing the relative 
minimum price between 2 different experience levels changes the experience distribution 
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provide evidence that adjusting relative minimum prices can be used to influence the 
experience distribution.  This is an important result for the NFL and other industries that 
employ minimum salary schedules because it shows that adjusting relative prices has the 
ability to be used as a policy instrument to change the experience distribution. 
Even though changing the relative price between 2 different experience levels 
change the experience distribution, some of the changes are opposite of the expected 
result.  This could mean that the roster constraint in the NFL is playing a role in how 
teams adjust to changes in relative prices that I am unable to observe.  Another possibility 
is the unlikely possibility of the percentage of players of a specific experience level 
increasing when they become relatively more expensive.  This could happen when the 
absolute price of the experience level that becomes relatively more expensive in terms of 
another experience level is less than the absolute price of the experience level that 
becomes relatively cheaper.  Due to salary cap constraints teams may only be able to 
employ the players who become relatively more expensive because employing more of 
the players who become relatively cheaper could cause the team to go over the salary cap.  
Another possibility is that it may be costly for teams to seek out players who are at 
experience level that becomes relatively cheaper.  For example, if a kicker or punter 
becomes relatively more expensive, it may be costly for a team to locate a kicker or a 
punter that is at an experience level that becomes relatively cheaper.  One possibility to 
address this issue is to look at how the experience distribution changes across positions 
instead of teams when the relative price between certain experience levels change.   
   
Copyright © Johnny C. Ducking 
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Figure 3.1:  Average Percentage of Players with 0, 1 to 2, 3 to 6, and 7 or More 
Years of Experience 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Average Percentage of Players with 0, 1 to 2, 3 to 6, and 7 or More 
Years of Experience (Sample Restricted to Players who Earn Less than $200 
Thousand Above the Minimum Salary) 
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Figure 3.3:  Relative Minimum Price Ratios of 1 to 2, 3 to 6, and 7 or More Years of 
Experience to 0 Years of Experience 
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Table 3.1:  Relative Minimum Prices of All Experience Levels in Terms of the Minimum Price for Zero Years of Experience 
Experience 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 years 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1 year 1.425 1.426 1.333 1.333 1.326 1.326 1.273 1.263 1.254 1.242 
2 years 1.855 1.861 1.667 1.667 1.652 1.652 1.545 1.526 1.508 1.484 
3 years 1.995 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.978 1.978 1.818 1.789 1.763 1.726 
4 years 2.140 2.144 2.333 2.356 2.326 2.348 2.127 2.088 2.051 2.000 
5 or 6 years 2.280 2.282 2.333 2.356 2.326 2.348 2.127 2.088 2.051 2.000 
7, 8, or 9 years 2.280 2.282 2.889 2.911 2.870 2.891 2.582 2.526 2.475 2.403 
10 or more years 2.280 2.282 3.333 3.356 3.304 3.326 2.945 2.877 2.814 2.726 
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Table 3.2:  Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Dependent  
percent_0_years_experience percentage of players with 0 years of experience 
on given team in a given year  
percent_1to2_years_experience percentage of players with 1 to 2 years of 
experience on given team in a given year  
percent_3to6_years_experience percentage of players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience on given team in a given year  
percent_7ormore_years_experience percentage of players with 7 or more years of 
experience on given team in a given year  
percent_0_years_restricted percentage of players with 0 years of experience 
on given team in a given year when the sample is 
restricted to players who earn less than $200 
thousand above the minimum 
percent_1to2_years_restricted percentage of players with 1 to 2 years of 
experience on given team in a given year when the 
sample is restricted to players who earn less than 
$200 thousand above the minimum 
percent_3to6_years_restricted percentage of players with 3 to 6 years of 
experience on given team in a given year when the 
sample is restricted to players who earn less than 
$200 thousand above the minimum 
percent_7ormore_years_restricted percentage of players with 7 or more years of 
experience on given team in a given year when the 
sample is restricted to players who earn less than 
$200 thousand above the minimum  
Independent  
relative_min_price_1to2_0 the ratio of the minimum salary for 1 to 2 years of 
experience to the minimum salary for 0 years of 
experience 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 the ratio of the minimum salary for 3 to 6 years of 
experience to the minimum salary for 0 years of 
experience 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 the ratio of the minimum salary for 7 or more years 
of experience to the minimum salary for 0 years of 
experience 
under_the_cap_in_ten_millions the amount a team is under the salary cap in ten 
million dollars 
team a vector of indicator variables representing the 
NFL teams 
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Table 3.3:  Correlation Coefficients between the Relative Prices for the Minimum Salary for All Experience Levels in Terms of 
the Minimum Salary for 0 Years of Experience 
 relative_min_
price_1_0 
relative_min_
price_2_0 
relative_min_
price_3_0 
relative_min_
price_4_0 
relative_min_
price_5to6_0 
relative_min
_price_7to9
_0 
relative_min
_price_10or
more_0 
relative_min_price
_1_0 
1.0000 0.9999 0.8408 0.3641 0.7177 -0.1667 -0.3796 
relative_min_price
_2_0 
0.9999 1.0000 0.8340 0.3525 0.7090 -0.1789 -0.3910 
relative_min_price
_3_0 
0.8408 0.8340 1.0000 0.8086 0.9782 0.3932 0.1814 
relative_min_price
_4_0 
0.3641 0.3525 0.8086 1.0000 0.9096 0.8569 0.7222 
relative_min_price
_5to6_0 
0.7177 0.7090 0.9782 0.9096 1.0000 0.5654 0.3697 
relative_min_price
_7to9_0 
-0.1667 -0.1789 0.3932 0.8569 0.5654 1.0000 0.9754 
relative_min_price
_10ormore_0 
-0.3796 -0.3910 0.1814 0.7222 0.3697 0.9754 1.0000 
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Table 3.4:  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
percent_0_years_experience 0.180 0.057 318 
percent_1to2_years_experience 0.273 0.603 318 
percent_3to6_years_experience 0.346 0.072 318 
percent_7ormore_years_experience 0.201 0.378 318 
percent_0_years_ restricted 0.233 0.071 318 
percent_1to2_years_ restricted 0.354 0.082 318 
percent_3to6_years_ restricted 0.277 0.078 318 
percent_7ormore_years_ restricted 0.136 0.078 318 
relative_min_price_1to2_0 1.319 0.062 318 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 2.219 0.131 318 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 2.928 0.391 318 
under_the_cap_in_ten_millions 0.472 1.462 318 
 
 
 
 
141 
Table 3.5:  Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
percent_0_years 
_experience 
percent_1to2_years 
_experience 
percent_3to6_years 
_experience 
percent_7ormore_years
_ experience 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
relative_min_price_1to2_0 4.458*** 1.148 -3.384*** -2.223*** 
 
(0.000) (0.197) (0.001) (0.008) 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 -2.025*** -0.468 1.490*** 1.002** 
 
(0.000) (0.265) (0.002) (0.012) 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 0.526*** 0.143 -0.392*** -0.278*** 
 
(0.000) (0.174) (0.001) (0.005) 
under_the_cap_in_ten_millions 0.010*** 0.003 -0.008*** -0.005** 
 
(0.000) (0.174) (0.003) (0.033) 
constant -2.739*** -0.584 2.632*** 1.691*** 
 
(0.000) (0.295) (0.000) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.44 
Number of obs 318 318 318 318 
P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 3.6:  Regression Results (Sample Restricted to Players Who Earn Less than $200 Thousand Above Their Minimum 
Salary) 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
percent_0_years 
_restricted 
percent_1to2_years 
_restricted 
percent_3to6_years 
_restricted 
percent_7ormore_years
_restricted 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
relative_min_price_1to2_0 2.704*** -2.447** -0.464 0.207 
 
(0.007) (0.037) (0.679) (0.833) 
relative_min_price_3to6_0 -1.388*** 1.017* 0.339 0.032 
 
(0.003) (0.066) (0.526) (0.945) 
relative_min_price_7ormore_0 0.345*** -0.262* -0.069 -0.015 
 
(0.004) (0.057) (0.599) (0.900) 
under_the_cap_in_ten_millions 0.012*** 0.001 -0.009*** -0.004* 
 
(0.000) (0.763) (0.001) (0.097) 
constant -1.254* 2.140*** 0.320 -0.205 
 
(0.051) (0.003) (0.640) (0.737) 
R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.43 
Number of obs 318 318 318 318 
P-values are in parentheses.  Significance Level:  ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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4 Conclusion 
This dissertation uses NFL data to measure the impact of minimum salaries on firm 
tenure, career length, and the experience distribution.  Chapter two focuses on the impact 
of minimum salaries on firm tenure and career length.  I present Kaplan Meier survival 
estimates that demonstrate that players who require an income increase have lower 
survivor rates than players who do not require an income increase.  The statistical 
significance and the negative sign of some of the mandatory raise and income increase 
variables in the various model specifications provide evidence that minimum salaries 
shorten a player’s firm tenure and career length when they require a team to give a player 
a mandatory raise or an income increase.  I provide further evidence that minimum 
salaries shorten firm tenure and career length by producing Weibull regression survival 
estimates that show that players who require a mandatory raise or an income increase 
have a lower survival rate. 
This analysis shows that firm tenure and career length are shortened when minimum 
salaries force a worker’s pay to be higher than his value to the firm.  This has 
implications for other industries because whenever minimum salaries force a worker’s 
pay to be higher than their value to firm, the worker’s firm tenure or career length is 
expected to be shortened regardless of industrial structure, gender, or magnitude of 
minimum salaries.  One potential problem with this study is that I am not able to control 
for injuries.  In spite of not controlling for injuries, I argue that the estimated models are 
not impacted negatively because what matters is not whether a player is injured but 
whether a player plays in the game or not.  This analysis also has direct implications for 
the NFL because shortening careers give more players an opportunity to play in the NFL.  
 
144 
 
If the goal of the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players Association is to give 
as many players as possible a chance to play in the NFL in order to increase overall 
interest in the NFL, shortening careers would be seen as a desirable result.  If the goal of 
the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players Association is to put the best players 
on the field, minimum salaries are not aligned with this objective because they limit a 
team’s ability to pay some players who are more productive than inexperienced players 
their value to the team. 
Future research could examine another sports league like the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) to analyze the impact of minimum salaries on firm tenure and career 
length to see whether the results found here are confirmed.  One advantage of looking at 
another sports industry is that even though the salaries are still higher than most other 
industries and only one gender is employed, it allows us to see if the industrial structure 
of the NFL is driving the results.  
Chapter three focuses on the impact of minimum salaries on the experience 
distribution.  The fact that minimum salaries in the NFL’s minimum salary schedule 
change in a way that changes the relative minimum prices between two experience levels 
provide teams with an incentive to substitute away from the experience level whose 
relative minimum price becomes more expensive.  I control for the amount a team is 
under the salary cap and team effects and find some evidence that changing relative 
minimum prices change the experience distribution.  I believe that some of the 
unexpected results for the relative price variables are due to the NFL’s industrial 
structure.  The NFL has a team salary constraint and a team roster constraint in place that 
limits the total amount that can be paid to a team and the total amount of players that can 
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be on a team.  It is unlikely but possible that the salary cap constraint cause teams to 
employ more of an experience level when it becomes more relatively more expensive.  
The reason for this possibility is that players who are becoming relatively more expensive 
may be cheaper and absolute terms and the salary cap may not allow for substitution 
towards the relatively cheaper experience level.  The team roster constraint may also be 
playing a role because teams may not be able to respond changing relative prices because 
of the roster limit. 
Future research on changing relative minimum prices could also examine another 
sports league like the NBA.  An advantage of looking at the NBA in this case is that it 
will also allow us to see if the industrial structure of the NFL is driving the results. 
These findings are important because any industry that employs a minimum salary 
schedule must be aware that this salary structure has the potential to reduce an 
employee’s firm tenure or career length.  Minimum salaries may also be set in a way that 
they change relative minimum prices giving them the potential to change the experience 
distribution in an undesirable manner. 
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